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SUMMARY - RESUMEN
The three chapters of this thesis investigate different topics in competition pol-
icy. The first chapter empirically analyzes the consequences of the subsidies
that were granted to some coalfields during the first years of the European
Coal and Steel Community (1954-1962). I show that subsidies granted to the
less efficient coalfields did not affect investment and thus failed in increas-
ing productivity. The second chapter theoretically shows that an incumbent
may implement loyalty rebates in order to prevent an efficient rival from en-
tering the market. Finally, the third chapter analyzes both theoretically and
empirically how the dynamics of a two-sided market affect the structure of the
vertical relationships between a producer and a platform. The type of vertical
relationship depends on the attractiveness of the brand sold and the size of
the platform’s installed base of customers. Depriving the platform of some
present sales may prevent it from choosing its favorite type of contractual ver-
tical relationship for future sales.
Los tres capítulos de esta tesis doctoral investigan aspectos de la economía
de la competencia. El primer capítulo analiza los efectos de las ayudas fi-
nancieras dirigidas a algunas minas durante los primeros años de la Comu-
nidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero (1954-1962). Se muestra que estas
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ayudas financieras no afectaron las inversiones de las minas y no permitieron
el crecimiento de la productividad. El segundo capítulo demuestra teoréti-
camente que una empresa dominante puede ofrecer descuentos de fidelidad
para impedir la entrada en el mercado de una empresa más eficiente. El tercer
capítulo analiza teorética y empíricamente como la dinámica de un mercado
“bilateral” afecta a las relaciones verticales entre un productor y la plataforma.
El tipo de relación vertical depende de la atractividad de la marca del produc-
tor y de la base de clientela de la plataforma. La privación de algunas ventas
en la plataforma puede impedir que la plataforma elija su tipo de relación
preferido en el futuro.
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INTRODUCTION
This doctoral thesis consists in three independent chapters that investigate
different aspects of the economics of competition policy. The role of eco-
nomic analysis in competition policy has become increasingly important, both
in practice and from a theoretical perspective. In particular, economists are
particularly active in two important antitrust debates, which influence the way
competition policy is implemented in practice.
The first debate, which has been fuelled by the Chicago School critique,
is at the core of competition policy, as it questions its economic efficiency.
The first two chapter of this thesis provide new insights into this debate, by
analyzing the efficiency of two different aspects of competition policy. The
first chapter of the thesis, entitled “Do taxes and Subsidies deter productivity?
Evidence from the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-1962,” takes
an historic approach to study the impact of State Aids, which are often used
by policymakers, and yet understudied in the academic literature. The sec-
ond chapter of the thesis, “Repeated Purchases, Loyalty Rebates, and Demand
Foreclosure,” focuses on exclusionary practices, and proposes a new model to
explain how a dominant firm can implement a loyalty rebate scheme that pre-
vent an efficient rival from entering the market. Such practices indeed justify
policy action against dominant firms.
The third chapter, entitled “Two-sided Market Dynamics: Theory and Ev-
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idence,” is related to a second, more recent debate, which focuses on multi-
sided markets. Nowadays, many commercial interactions are operated through
such markets, where a platform sells to several distinct groups of users that
may affect each other’s utility. Such markets are characterized by externali-
ties between the various sides of the market, which significantly affect their
functioning and their dynamics. The characteristics of such markets raise the
question of the efficiency of competition policy, as it is currently implemented.
Indeed, experts generally argue that some practices that are generally consid-
ered anticompetitive, such as below-cost pricing, result from the normal com-
petitive behavior in industries where there exist externalities between differ-
ent sides of the market. The dynamic model developed in this chapter shows
that exclusive dealing may have significant deterrent effects in such markets.
In the remainder of this introduction, I present these three contributions
to the economics of competition policy in more detail.
Chapter 1: Do taxes and Subsidies deter productivity? Evi-
dence from the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-
1962
In this first chapter, I exploit the creation of the first European Common Mar-
ket as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the effects of taxes and sub-
sidies on firms’ productivity. During the first years of the European Coal and
Steel Community, from 1954 to 1958, national and supranational subsidies
were granted to the less efficient coalfields in order to make them integrate the
common market, while more productive coalfields were taxed. Using hand-
collected data on coalfield productivity in Europe and the UK, I implement a
10
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difference-in-difference method and find robust evidence that the end of this
period significantly increased coalfields’ productivity. I also investigate how
coalfields’ rationalization and investment decisions were affected by taxes and
subsidies. My results suggest that taxes have a deterrent effect both on in-
vestment and productivity, while subsidies seem to fail both to significantly
increase investment and to enhance productivity.
Chapter 2: Repeated Purchases, Loyalty Rebates, and De-
mand Foreclosure
In this chapter, I show that, under demand heterogeneity, loyalty rebates are
extremely effective entry-deterrent strategies because they allow the incum-
bent to set a high price for the sales of present units and to commit to a low
price for future units, thereby depriving the entrant of the scale it needs. This
issue is directly related to the critique of the Chicago School, which argue
that a firm cannot extent its market power either to prevent an efficient rival
from entering the market or to increase its profit on another connected mar-
ket. This approach has subsequently been criticized and several papers have
developed models showing that such practices may succeed in leveraging the
dominant firm market power.
The pricing mechanism developed in this chapter adds to this literature,
but diametrically differs from exclusionary contracts and pricing schemes pro-
posed in previous papers. It consists in charging an aggressive first-period
price to deter entry before enjoying a leveraged dominant position in subse-
quent periods. Moreover, in my model, there is no need for the incumbent to
know ex-ante each customer’s type to deter entry, as it can use optimal loyalty
rebates to implement an incentive-compatible menu of prices. Furthermore,
11
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rebates may induce some customers to purchase unneeded units from the
incumbent, generating additional revenue that finances its exclusionary strat-
egy. This contrasts with the existing literature on this topic that generally
considers that such “buyer opportunism” does not exist at equilibrium.
Chapter 3: Two-sided Market Dynamics: Theory and Evi-
dence1
This last chapter develops a dynamic model of two-sided markets based on an
extensive dataset provided by an e-commerce platform that operates online
private sales. The model analyzes precisely how customer-side externalities
affect the development of the platform and in particular, how it changes its
relationship with producers. In the model, the attractiveness of the prod-
uct brand and the size of the customer base affect the bargaining power of
the producer vis-à-vis the platform, thereby influencing the choice of the sell-
ing mode. Some sales are operated under the reseller mode where the plat-
form purchases and re-sells the goods, choosing the final price. This contrasts
with the marketplace selling mode, where the producer uses the platform to
“advertise” the sale but controls the price charged to customers. The model
shows that the platform may impose the marketplace mode when its bar-
gaining power increases. The empirical analysis corroborates these findings.
Finally, simulations of the dynamics of the model demonstrate that a rival may
significantly alter the growth of the platform, by offering exclusive contracts
to the producer. Preventing the platform from marketing a brand also affects
its ability to choose its preferred selling mode in the future.
1This chapter is based on a paper co-written with Romain de Nijs.
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CHAPTER 1
DO TAXES AND SUBSIDIES DETER
PRODUCTIVITY? EVIDENCE FROM THE
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
COMMUNITY, 1954-1962
1.1 Introduction1
On April 18, 1951, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands ratified the Treaty of Paris, which founded the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC main economic objectives were “to
ensure supply to the common market, [...] to ensure the establishment of the
lowest prices, [and] to encourage firms to develop their production potential”.2
In other terms, the aim of the ECSC (through the action of the High Authority)
was to create a competitive European market for coal and steel. Accordingly,
1I thank Gabrielle Fack, Philippe Février, Juan-José Ganuza, Massimo Motta, Helena Per-
rone, Anne Perrot, David Spector, Hans-Joachim Voth. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See Mioche (2002), p. 12.
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the Treaty abolished custom barriers on February 1, 1952 for coal, and on
May 1, 1953 for steel. However, during the first years of the Community, from
1954 to 1958, which are referred to as the “transition period,” the High Au-
thority of the ECSC subsidized the less efficient coal mines in order to “avoid
swift and dangerous changes in production, [...] to prepare them [both] to in-
tegrate the common market,”3 and to face fierce competition from the most
efficient mines. To do so, the High Authority granted – and allowed National
Governments to grant significant subsidies to the less efficient mines of the
Community. In particular, the French government was allowed to provide
some of the French coalfields with financial support. Furthermore, the High
Authority implemented a “perequation system,” which consisted in levying
taxes from German and Dutch coal producers to support Belgian and Italian
coal production. Such financial aids were designed in such a way that they
allowed Belgian and French coal producers to match German and Dutch pro-
ducers’ prices in various geographic areas. The High Authority put a definitive
end to this tax and subsidy system on February 9, 1958, precisely four years
after it was implemented.
Providing firms or even an entire economic sector with financial support –
whatever the form it may take, is a common, and probably the simplest, in-
dustrial policy. In the US, some important economic sectors (e.g., automobile,
banking and agriculture) benefited from State or Federal subsidies. In the EU,
State aids are also commonly granted to firms. From 2001 to 2013, 4.765
cases of State aids have been notified to the EU Directorate General for Com-
petition (DG Comp), 3.122 to the DG Agriculture and 495 to the DG Maritime
Affairs.4 The aim of such an industrial policy is to allow the less efficient firms
3See the document entitled “L’application du Traité instituant la CECA au cours de la
période transitoire,” p. 23 – Historical Archives of the European Union.
4Source: European Commission. See
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/statistics/statistics_en.html.
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to remain active on the market while giving them the opportunity to make the
necessary investments to increase their productivity. However, such a policy
also distorts competition. This explains why they are generally considered per
se anti-competitive. On the one hand, some firms, amongst the less efficient,
are provided with financial aid that allow them to resist fierce competition
from the more efficient rivals. On the other hand, more productive firms are
implicitly or explicitly taxed more heavily.
In this paper, I exploit the creation of the first European Common Market
as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the effects of financial aids on
firms’ productivity. More precisely, I first assess the global impact of the end of
the transition period on coal mines’ productivity. Second, I analyse separately
the specific effects of the taxes levied and the subsidies granted in the context
of the ECSC.
This paper is directly related to the literature, which is still little devel-
oped, on the effects of State aids. Most of the theoretical literature on State
aids points out the necessity of control, especially to ensure that countries do
not engage in a collectively wasteful “subsidy war,”5 but does not analyze the
consequences of national or supranational subsidies on firms’ outcomes.6 The
empirical literature is very limited and finds mixed results. Criscuolo et al.
(2012), study the EU funded “Regional Selective Assistance” program that
provides firms with financial support in specific regions. They analyze the
impact of subsidies on firms’ employment and productivity of UK firms and
instrument aid reception by the exogenous changes in EU rules for aid eligi-
bility. They find a significant impact on employment for small firms, but no
clear effect on productivity. Moreover it is not clear whether their results could
extend to other types of State aids that are often targeted to large industrial
5Dewatripont et Seabright (2006).
6See Friederiszick et al. (2007) for a survey.
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sectors.
The effect of taxes on firms’ investment decisions has been much more
extensively analyzed in the economic literature. Most studies focus on perma-
nent changes in tax policy that affect the user cost of capital, such as changes
in corporate tax rates or R&D tax incentives, and find that they have an effect
on investment.7 The effect on productivity, is however, very rarely assessed.
Finally, my paper is also related to a flourishing literature that aims at
understanding the main drivers of firms’ productivity. Most studies analyze
the effects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity.8 For
instance, Bloom et al. (2008) study the impact of Chinese import competi-
tion on technology and employment in twelve European countries during the
last decade. They conclude that Chinese import competition increases the IT
intensity of surviving firms, while it decreases employment. Bustos (2011)
draws similar conclusions from her analysis of the impact of MERCOSUR on
Argentinean firms. She provides evidence that expanded trade opportunities
induce firms to upgrade technology. Some papers exploit the creation of com-
mon markets as I do. For instance, Griffith et al. (2006) study the effects
of the EU Single Market Programme (SMP), which consists in a large scale
reform implemented by the members of the European Union to reduce inter-
nal non-tariff barriers to trade. This reform was undertaken across a large
number of countries. The authors identify the impact of the SMP from other
macroeconomic effects, by including countries that were not involved in SMP
as a control group and use cross-industry variations. This estimation strategy
allows them to show that the increase in competition had a positive impact
on innovative activity.
7See Hasset et Hubbard (2002) for a review, and Djankov et al. (2010) or Bloom et al.
(2002) for recent empirical analysis.
8For a comprehensive review of literature on the link between competition and productiv-
ity, see Holmes et Schmitz (2010).
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This literature reveals the various difficulties raised when assessing the ef-
fect of taxes and subsidies on firms’ productivity. In some cases, the changes
induced by the policy may be endogenous and at least partly caused by firms’
behaviors. Another problem may be faced when the well-identified change
in policy affects a large number of more or less connected markets, creating
general equilibrium effects. Finally, firms generally adapt many aspects of
their production process and characteristics of their products in response to a
change in the competitive environment (firms may change their locations or
alter the main characteristics of their products in some ways that are difficult
to predict or observe, and very likely to bias the result of the empirical anal-
ysis).9 The specific case of the creation of the common market for coal and
steel is of particular interest as it addresses in a satisfactory way these main
challenges. The “transition period” is a well-identified and exogenous change
in the competitive environment of the market for coal. The rules for the recep-
tion of taxes and subsidies were clearly stated in the Treaty, and the end of the
perequation system was determined by the High Authority. Moreover, the pol-
icy only affected specific industrial sectors in specific countries. The focus on
the coal sector allows me to measure very precisely the effect of the policy on
investment and productivity in this industry. Coal quality is given by the geo-
logical characteristics of the mine, which are exogenous fixed parameters that
cannot be adapted to the economic environment. After controlling for these
characteristics, the evolution of mine productivity can be precisely measured
and compared both across coalfields and over time. Furthermore, coalfields
located in similar countries, such as the UK, which did not participate in the
European Coal and steel Community, can be used as a control group.
In this paper, I first exploit the end of the “transition period” in a difference-
9See Vogel (2008).
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in-difference analysis and find robust evidence that the end of the perequation
system induced coalfields to significantly increase their productivity. Second,
I specifically assess the effect of taxes and subsidies on firms’ rationalization
behavior and investment. One may expect taxes to deter investments, includ-
ing productive investments that aim at fostering productivity. The magnitude
of the effect is, however, an empirical question. The effect of subsidies on in-
vestment and productivity is theoretically ambiguous. Subsidies may increase
investment, by lowering its cost. However, most of the subsidies are only given
to less efficient firms, which may expect to loose this financial support if they
increase their productivity. Subsidized firms may not have any interest in in-
vesting in the most efficient technologies in order to remain eligible for future
financial support. The net impact of subsidies therefore needs to be estimated.
I separately analyze the effects of taxes and subsidies and find that taxes have
a both a deterrent effect on investment and productivity, while subsidies do
not have any significant effect on productive investment expenditure, and fail
to increase productivity.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the his-
torical context and specify the various subsidies granted during the “transition
period” in order to prepare less efficient firms to compete on the merits within
a common market. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics and
section 4 details the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and
section 6 concludes.
1.2 Historical context
From February 7, 1954 to February 9, 1858, the High Authority of the ECSC
implemented the measures it considered necessary for the creation of the com-
18
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mon market and the progressive adaptation of production to the new condi-
tions in which it took place. The main objective of this transition period was
indeed to ensure that each active coalfield within the ECSC would be in a
position to compete within a common market.
The High Authority of the ECSC either granted significant financial sup-
port to the less productive mines of the Community or authorized the State
members to do the same. The High Authority established a perequation levy
per ton of coal sold, which represented a uniform percentage of producers’ av-
erage revenues, on the coal production of the countries where average costs
were less than the weighted average of the Community. Belgian and Italian
mines benefited from these subsidies, while German and Dutch mine produc-
ers were taxed to finance the aids. In addition, several coalfields also benefited
from national governmental support.
More precisely, the Belgian mines, mostly located in the North (Campine
area) and in the South (Bassin Sud) of the country, were provided with finan-
cial support from both the Belgian government and the ECSC, through the
perequation system. Such subsidies aimed at lowering the price of Belgian
coal to all consumers of such coal in the common market to the vicinity of
the forecast costs of production of such coal at the end of the transition pe-
riod, with a view to bringing it as close as possible to the common market
price. The High Authority also granted an additional compensation for the
exports of Belgian coal, which corresponded to 80 percent of the difference,
determined by the High Authority, between the delivered price (F.O.B. plus
transport) of Belgian coal and the delivered price of coal from other countries
of the Community. Furthermore, the High Authority also imposed maximum
price lists in well-defined geographical areas to ensure that the level of subsi-
dies granted to the less efficient mines (in particular Belgian coalfields) were
19
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adequate and allowed them to compete with the most efficient ones. Such
price regulation was used to mitigate competition, especially between Belgian
and German mines, in order to prepare the former to face fierce competition
pressure from the latter. The High Authority put an end to this area prices in
1958, at the end of the transition period.
In Italy, mines located in La Thuile (in the Alps) as well as in Sulcis (in
Sardinia) were also granted significant financial support.
In France, mines did not benefit from the perequation system of subsidy
(as their costs were close to the weighted average production cost of the
ECSC coalfields), but the High Authority authorized the French government
to grant “limited” subsidies to French coalfields.10 The subsidies provided to
the French mines decreased during the transition period and finally came to
an end in 1957.
Finally, French, Italian and Belgium coalfields benefited also from the
perequation system as they were not taxed by the Authority. Such tax reduc-
tions can be interpreted as an aid as German and Dutch mines, which did not
receive any subsidy during the transition period, did have to pay extra taxes.
Table 1.1 displays the amount of taxes levied on German and Dutch mines, as
well as the amount of subsidies granted to Belgian and Italian mines through
the perequation system.
During these five years, the subsidy granted the Belgian mines through the
perequation system amounted $50m, which corresponded to 8 percent of the
value of the annual Belgian coal production. The financial advantage given
to Belgian mines compared to German ones is therefore about $100m, which
represented about 15 percent of the value of the annual Belgian coal produc-
10The Authority also allowed the French government to subsidize imports of coke (a specific
type of coal) that can be used with coal produced in Saarland and in Lorraine (in the East of
the country) in order to produce steel. In addition, the French government subsidized these
two coalfields until 1955.
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TABLEAU 1.1: The perequation system: subsidies and taxes (in $m)
1952-1953 1953-1951 1954-1955 1955-1956 1956- 1957 1957-1958 Total
I. Taxes
German mines 2,932 13,880 14,483 10,980 7,601 2,645 52,521
Dutch mines 248 1,204 1,210 1,123 682 0 4,467
Total 3,180 15,084 15,693 12,103 8,283 2,645 56,988
II. Subsidies
Belgian mines 488 11,889 14,183 11,830 7,997 3,686 50,073
Italian mines 0 2,400 2,640 960 520 0 6,520
Total 488 14,289 16,823 12,790 8,517 3,686 56,593
SOURCES: Haute Autorité, C.E.C.A Rapport Financier pour l’Année 1958, Annexes
tion. These figures do not take into account the above-mentioned subsidies
granted by the national governments. In addition to the subsidies distributed
by the ECSC, the Belgian government paid about $90m to Belgian coal pro-
ducers between 1953 and 1958, especially to help the coalfields located in
Belgium’s Borinage mining region. The State aids that the French govern-
ment was allowed to distribute to French coal producers amounted to about
$100m between 1953 and 1956.
The Treaty of Paris explicitly stipulated that the perequation system was
to end in February 1958. However, it clearly appeared that the effectiveness
of the subsidies granted to the Belgian mines was extremely limited. The Bel-
gian State finally provided its less efficient mines with financial support even
after the end of the transition period, with the consent of the High Authority.
The High Authority accepted such additional financial support imposing some
drastic conditions, including the closing of the less productive coal extraction
sites. I analyze these post-1958 subsidies in order to disentangle the effects of
taxes and subsidies on coal mines’ productivity.
In the next sections, I therefore analyze not only the global impact of the
end of the transition period on productivity in the coal industry, but I also
assess more specifically the effect of the taxes and subsidies distributed by the
ECSC and national governments.
21
Three Essays in Competition Policy
1.3 Data and Descriptive statistics
1.3.1 Data
In order to measure productivity in the coal industry, I hand-collected weekly
data for production and number of workers (as well as other variables as
number of working days and absenteeism), for 18 coalfields in the Commu-
nity, from January 1954 to January 1963 at the Historical Archives of the
European Community. These very detailed data, which are referred to as
Statistiques hebdomadaires (Weekly Statistics), come from the statistics divi-
sion of the High Authority of the ECSC. This information is available for 18
coalfields in the ECSC, which are displayed on the map below (Figure 1.1).11
I use this information to compute the productivity for each coalfield. It is de-
fined as the ratio of its weekly production (in tons) to the weekly number of
workers active in the corresponding mines. Productivity is thus expressed in
ton per worker per week.
Other information regarding ECSC coalfields mainly comes from the Rap-
ports généraux sur l’activité de la Communauté (General Reports of the activity
of the High Authority),12 which describe the political, social and economic
situation of coal and steel industries in the ECSC. The statistics appendices
of these reports provide annual figures regarding inter ECSC countries coal
exchanges and import and export to countries outside the Community. These
appendices also report the annual production of steel per region within the
11The coalfields for which the data are available are the following: Campine and Bassin
Sud in Belgium; Aquitaine, Auvergne, Blanzy, Cévennes, Dauphiné, Loire, Lorraine, Nord Pas
de Calais, and other mines (located in the West) in France; Aachen, Niedersachen and Ruhr
in Germany; La Thuile and Sulcis in Italy and Limburg in the Netherlands. The last coalfield
for which data are available is Saarland, a German region that was under French control
from 1947 to 1957, even though the economic “reunification” with Germany dated July 7,
1959, when West Germany’s Deutsche Mark became the official currency. In our analysis, we
classify Saarland as a German mine.
12See the sources in Appendix.
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ECSC, which, as further explained below, is used as proxy of the regional de-
mand for coal. In addition, information contained in these reports allowed me
to construct time series on the number of active sites and annual investment
per site for each coalfield.13 In order to construct the time series on taxes and
subsidies from the perequation system and State Aids, I used the Financial
Reports as well as the Official Journal of the ECSC.
Finally, I collected information regarding coalfields’ production and num-
ber of workers in the UK, as a control group. This information comes from
the Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory published by the National
Coal Board. Information is available for 8 coalfields in England, Wales and
Scotland (See Figure 1.1).14
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
This section describes the ECSC coalfields as well as intra-community coal
exports. It also reports descriptive statistics on coal production and coalfield’s
productivity in ECSC countries as well in the UK.
ECSC coalfields’ location The location of mines in the ECSC, as shown in
Figure 1.1, is very concentrated in the “industrial triangle” as defined in the
Schuman Plan (see Figure 1.2). This industrial triangle is a relatively small re-
gion in the middle of Western Europe, which was considered as the “industrial
heart” of the European community. Indeed, Figure 1.2 shows that this area
did not only concentrate coal production, but also steel centers, as steelworks
13The information on number of active sites and investment is available for regrouped
categories of coalfields: Aachen, Niedersachsen and Saar in Germany, Campine and Bassin
Sud in Belgium, Limburg in the Netherlands, Nord Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Centre-Midi and
other mines in France, and all Italian mines together. Figures for the number of active sites
are sometimes missing for specific years: I imputed it using a linear approximation.
14These coalfields are the following: Durham, East Midlands, North Western, Northern,
Scotland, South Western, West Midlands and Yorkshire.
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located in this region produced 81 percent of the total ECSC production in
1952.15
FIGURE 1.1: Location of Coalfields in the ECSC and the UK
NOTES: Coalfields have been geolocalized with Google Maps.
Intra-ECSC annual coal exports Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of annual
coal exports from the various ECSC countries within the Community. It shows
the relative economic power of each ECSC country in the market for coal.
Germany is the largest exporting country, before France and Belgium. Inter-
estingly, the evolution of intra-ECSC coal exports suggests that the national
subsidies and, more globally, the perequation system (i.e., both taxes levied
in Germany and in the Netherlands, and subsidies granted to Belgian and Ital-
ian mines) distorted intra-community trade. The share of intra-ECSC exports
from Belgium and France decreased after the end of the transition period,
while it increased for German and Dutch mines. This suggests the fact that the
15Calculations from the Sixième rapport général, Annexe statistique, C.E.C.A., 1958, tables
22 and 23 p. 371.
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FIGURE 1.2: The ECSC and the industrial triangle
www.ena.lu 2 / 2Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)
The industrial triangle
NOTES: Map illustrating the size of the coalfields and heavy industry
regions in some of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel
Community in March 1951.
SOURCES: The Schuman Plan. Keystone. Black and White.
implementation of the subsidy system affected the relative economic power of
the main coalfields by increasing the weakest mines’ exports and decreasing
the exports of the strongest ones.
Coalfields’ production and productivity Table 1.2 shows the evolution of
the average weekly coal production and productivity at the country level: UK
is the largest producer, followed by Germany, France, Belgium, The Nether-
lands and Italy. Tables 1.3 and 1.4, which report in greater details the average
production and productivity by coalfield, confirm that the productive capacity
of coalfields is very heterogeneous: the Ruhr coalfield in Germany accounts
for almost half of the ECSC total production, whereas La Thuile and Sulcis
in Italy account for respectively 0.03 percent and 0.4 percent of the ECSC
production in 1954. France also has several very small coalfields that ac-
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FIGURE 1.3: Evolution of relative intra-ECSC exports
NOTES: Huitième rapport général, C.E.C.A., 1960, Annexe Statistique, Table 7, 8 and 19 and Douxième rapport
général, C.E.C.A., 1964, Annexe Statistique, Table 8, 9 and 11.
count each for less than 1 percent of the total ECSC production (Aquitaine,
Auvergne, Dauphiné and Autres mines). Finally, the evolution of the average
productivity shown in Table 1.2 suggests that ECSC countries experienced a
quick increase in productivity after the end of the transition period. In the
next section, I develop an empirical strategy to precisely estimate the impact
of the end of the transition period, as well as the specific effect of taxes and
subsidies on coal producers’ investments and productivity.
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TABLEAU 1.2: Evolution of coal production and productivity in ECSC and
UK
Average weekly coal production (tons)
Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands UK
1954 568,960 1,052,446 2,798,944 20,046 233,676 4,035,525
1955 578,775 1,058,591 2,834,238 21,195 228,764 3,968,454
1956 574,467 1,058,687 2,921,940 20,054 226,859 3,960,114
1957 562,362 1,092,854 2,895,716 18,766 217,890 3,964,862
1958 525,821 1,113,132 2,881,704 13,129 227,656 3,800,662
1959 446,771 1,124,520 2,730,591 13,709 227,538 3,685,283
1960 445,062 1,090,648 2,754,232 13,387 239,106 3,468,827
1961 433,211 1,009,379 2,732,596 14,057 241,102 3,397,731
1962 414,207 1,016,353 2,743,556 13,183 223,233 3,550,096
Average weekly productivity (tons/worker)
Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands UK
1954 5.0 7.2 7.3 3.0 7.2 6.1
1955 5.2 7.4 7.5 3.8 7.1 6.0
1956 5.3 7.5 7.5 4.2 7.0 6.0
1957 5.7 7.7 7.5 4.2 7.0 6.0
1958 5.8 8.0 7.7 4.6 7.2 5.9
1959 6.1 8.3 8.6 5.2 7.6 6.0
1960 6.6 8.7 9.7 5.9 8.5 6.2
1961 7.2 9.1 10.4 6.7 9.5 6.5
1962 7.8 9.4 11.2 7.3 9.4 7.0
NOTES: Average productivity is computed by weighting each coalfield by its share in production. ECSC statistics
are computed from the Statistiques Hebdomadaires published by the Statistics Division of the High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community. UK Statistics are computed from the Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory
published by the National Coal Board.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
1.4.1 Estimating the effect of the end of transition period
on firms’ productivity
The difference in difference strategy I first analyze the global impact of
the end of the transition period on coalfields’ productivity using a difference
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TABLEAU 1.3: Descriptive statistics of the ECSC coalfields (1954-1962)
Average weekly Average weekly Share in Steel production Index of steed demand
production productivity ECSC production in the area in the area
In tons in tons per worker in 1954 (%) in 1952 (1000t) in 1952 (1000t)
Belgium
Bassin Sud 317629 5.3 8.34 5.2 22.5
(64651) (.8)
Campine 187886 7.3 3.83 0.0 23.3
(10049) (1.0)
France
Aquitaine 41338 8.8 .81 .5 1.1
(1822) (1.6)
Auvergne 22111 7.5 .45 .7 1.1
(1597) (1.2)
Blanzy 50773 8.9 1.04 .7 1.1
(1935) (.8)
Cévennes 53201 6.8 1.15 .7 1.1
(6706) (.7)
Dauphiné 12516 7.9 .22 .7 1.1
(1322) (1.1)
Loire 60791 7.3 1.37 .5 1.1
(7524) (.7)
Lorraine 274368 11.4 5.4 7.1 22.2
(18074) (1.2)
Nord PdC 547692 6.6 11.9 2.3 15.0
(16066) (.4)
Autres mines 5724 6.2 .17 .2 .3
(1847) (1.3)
Germany
Aachen 148574 7.2 2.83 13.4 24.9
(10795) (1.4)
Niedersachsen 45930 7.1 1.01 1.3 6.1
(2465) (1.8)
Ruhr 2301753 8.7 49.12 13.4 24.9
(72371) (1.6)
Saar 314134 8.7 6.92 2.8 22.4
(11319) (.6)
Italy
La Thuile 860 4.6 .03 3.0 .7
(338) (1.2)
Sulcis 15532 5.0 .4 3.0 0.0
(3250) (1.5)
Netherlands
Limbourg 229536 7.8 5.0 .7 24.5
(7358) (1.0)
NOTES: Statistics are computed from the Statistiques Hebdomadaires published by the Statistics Division of the High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Steel production in 1952
in the area computed from C.E.C.A., Sixième rapport général, Annexe statistique, tables 22 et 23 p.371. I matched steel
centers to coalfields and considered that Aachen and Rurh corresponded to the same steel center (Ruhr and Aachen),
Aquitaine and Loire where in the “Ouest” and Auvergne, Blanzy, Cévennes and Dauphiné in the“Centre” areas. Index
of steel demand takes into account a weighted sum of steel production in 1952 within 400 km of each area (see text
for further explanations).
in difference method, where UK is the control group. I use the UK as a control
group as it was not affected by the policy changes in ECSC countries. UK is the
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TABLEAU 1.4: Descriptive statistics of the UK coalfields (1954-1962)
Average weekly Average weekly Share of the coalfield
production productivity in UK production
In tons in Tons per worker in 1954 (%)
Durham 465000 4.9 12.35
(27142) (.2)
East Midlands 875569 8.9 21.79
(20942) (.4)
North Western 274509 5.3 7.46
(30774) (.3)
Northern 227221 5.2 5.84
(12870) (.4)
Scottish 380630 4.8 10.76
(40440) (.3)
South Western 403040 4.1 11.38
(48915) (.1)
West Midlands 312646 6.0 8.63
(35283) (.4)
Yorkshire 820447 6.3 21.79
(36912) (.3)
Statistics are computed from the yearly data of the Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory published by the
National Coal Board. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
largest European coal producer, with a production equal to around 80 percent
of the total production in ECSC countries. UK has a similar level of develop-
ment than ECSC countries in 1950 and it is likely that technological changes
in coal production would affect UK and other European countries in the same
way. I checked that, despite the geographical proximity, coal exchanges be-
tween ECSC countries and the UK were relatively limited over the period.
Figure 1.4 shows that the imports and exports between the UK and ECSC
countries were almost negligible, relative to their production. I am therefore
confident that changes in the competitive pressure in ECSC countries would
not affect the UK directly, as the markets were not very well interconnected at
this time.
UK coalfields can be used to control for any common shock that could have
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affected productivity after 1958. The identifying assumption is that absent
the ECSC policy change, any productivity shock would have affected the UK
and other countries in the same way. Figure 1.5 shows that productivity in
UK and ECSC evolved similarly between 1954 and 1957. After the end of
the transition period however, productivity increased significantly in ECSC
countries whereas it evolved much more smoothly in the UK. As expected, the
break in trend happens in 1958. The following empirical analysis confirms
this suggestive evidence.
30
Chap. 1
FIGURE 1.4: Evolution of productivity in ECSC and UK (1954 -1962)
(a) UK total coal production, and exchanges with the ECSC, 1954-1962
(b) ECSC total coal production, and exchanges with the UK, 1954-1962
NOTES: Huitième rapport général, C.E.C.A., 1960, Annexe Statistique, Tables 7, 8 and 19 and Douxième rapport
général, C.E.C.A., 1964,Annexe Statistique, Tables 8, 9 and 11.
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FIGURE 1.5: Evolution of productivity in ECSC and UK (1954 -1962)
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NOTES: Average productivity is computed by weighting each coalfield by its share in production in ECSC or UK. ECSC
statistics are computed from the Statistiques Hebdomadaires published by the Statistics Division of the High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community. UK Statistics are computed from the Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory
published by the National Coal Board.
Specifically, I estimate the following model:
yict = ↵ +  .ECSC ⇤ Post1958 +  t + ⌫c + ✏it, (1.1)
where yict is the productivity of a coalfield i in country c at time t and ECSC ⇤
Post1958 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for ECSC countries after the end
of the transition period (i.e. after 1958). The specification includes year fixed
effects  t to control for common shocks at the European level that could affect
productivity, and country fixed effects ⌫c to control for fixed differences in
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productivity across countries.16 As a robustness check, I include coalfield fixed
effects instead of country fixed effects in some specifications. The coefficient
of interest is  , which measures how the productivity of coalfields located
in ECSC country changed after the end of the transition period. One would
expect   to be positive, if the end of the transition period yields to an increase
in competitive pressure and productivity.
Robustness checks The specification from equation 1.1 allows me to as-
sess whether the end of the transition period had an impact on productiv-
ity in ECSC coalfields. The validity of the difference-in-difference strategy is
based on the assumption that, absent the ECSC policy change, any produc-
tivity shock would have affected the UK and other countries in the same way.
In other terms, the post-1958 increase in productivity should be driven by
ECSC coalfields’ strategic decisions (and not from some technical change that
would have affected all of the ECSC coalfields). ECSC coalfields’ incentives
to increase productivity depend on the size of the market to be served as the
reduction of a given firm’s marginal cost is all the more profitable that the
demand that it serves is significant. I therefore analyze the differential effect
of the end of the transition period as a function of the size of the market.
In order to analyze precisely whether the size of the market matters, I
restrict the sample to ECSC coalfields, for which I have weekly production
data. I use steel production as a proxy for the level of demand faced by
each coalfield. Steel production is a good proxy for the industrial demand for
coal, as steel industries are by far the largest consumers of coal in the 1950s
(around 30 percent of total ECSC coal production is used for steel produc-
tion in 1957).17 Data on steel production in ECSC regional areas is available
16Note that the choice of a yearly analysis is driven by data limitations in the UK, as I was
not yet able to access weekly data for all the period in the control group.
17This number comes from my calculations using data on coal and coke use in 1957 from
33
Three Essays in Competition Policy
from ECSC reports. Table 1.3 shows the production of steel in the area of
each coalfield in 1952 (note that steel areas may cover several coalfields).18
The Ruhr/Aachen steel center is the largest, with 13,400 tons produced in
1952, followed by Lorraine (7,100t) and Bassin Sud (5,200t). This proxy for
demand, however, does not reflect the fact that some areas are very close to
each other. I therefore also calculate an index of steel demand (ISD), which
takes into account a weighted sum of steel production in 1952 within 400 km
of each coalfield. Weights are calculated as triangular weights: in order to
take into account steel production in area j for coalfield i, I create a weight
equal to : wi = 1   di/400 if the distance di between the two coalfields is
less than 400 km and 0 otherwise. The two measures are correlated (see Ta-
ble 1.3), but the index shows that coalfields located in the industrial triangle
may serve a potentially large demand, even though steel production within
their restricted area is relatively limited.
I estimate the following model, where I interact the variable indicating
the end of the transition period in ECSC countries with Di, the proxy for the
demand faced by coalfield i:
yict = ↵ +  .ECSC ⇤ Post1958 ⇤Di +  .Di +  t + ⌫c + ✏it (1.2)
The coefficient of interest is  , which measures the differential effect of
the end of the transition period on coalfields’ productivity. I expect   to be
positive, as coalfields serving larger markets should have a higher incentive
the Septième rapport général sur l’activité de la communauté, C.E.C.A., 1959, p.54. Total coal
production in ECSC in 1957 is equal to 189,846,000 tons. Around 40 percent is used for
coke production, and 1.7 percent goes directly to the steel industry. Data on coke production
shows that 68 percent of coke is used for steel production. The total amount of coal used in
steel production is therefore equal to 68 ⇤ 0.4 + 1.7 = 28.9.
18Using data from the Sixième rapport général, Annexe statistique, C.E.C.A., I match steel
centers to coalfields. I consider that Aachen and Ruhr correspond to the same steel center
(Ruhr and Aachen), Aquitaine and Loire where in the “Ouest” and Auverge, Blanzy, Cévennes
and Dauphiné in the “Centre” areas.
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to increase their productivity after the end of the transition period than coal-
fields located in smaller markets. Note that I cannot estimate the average
effect of the end of the transition period, as we include year fixed effects that
absorb the year-to-year changes in productivity that are common to all ECSC
coalfields. I also run regressions where I include coalfield fixed effects instead
of country fixed effects.
In the main analysis, I run the regression on the sample of all coalfields.
As a robustness check, I restrict the sample to coalfields whose share of ECSC
is larger than 1 percent in 1954, in order to ensure that small coalfields do
not drive the results. I also checked that excluding Belgium, which continued
to receive State Aid after 1958, does not change the results.
1.4.2 The differential effect of taxes and subsidies on pro-
ductivity
In the specifications presented so far, I analyze the global effect of the end
of the transition period on productivity. I next study more precisely the dif-
ferential effect of taxes and subsidies on productivity. I also investigate how
taxes and subsidies may affect rationalization of production and investment
in ECSC coalfields.
Figure 1.6 shows how total taxes and subsidies evolved over the period in
ECSC countries. 19 The perequation system ended in 1958: all taxes paid and
subsidies received from the perequation fund ended at this date. Even though
French coalfields did not receive any subsidy from the ECSC fund, they were
allowed to receive large state aids until 1956. Belgium benefited both from
19Data is available at the country level, as the detail on how subsidies were distributed is
not specified for all coalfields.
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state aid and subsidies in the perequation system. Moreover, as discussed in
the previous sections, the High Authority allowed the Belgian government to
give additional subsidies to its coalfields after 1958, but the authorization of
these state aids was contingent upon the adoption of drastic rationalization
measures.
FIGURE 1.6: Evolution of taxes and subsidies in ECSC countries
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SOURCES: ECSC General reports and Financial reports.
Figure 1.7 shows the corresponding evolution of productivity in ECSC coal-
fields: there is a clear break in trend for Germany and the Netherlands after
1958, the two countries that were previously taxed. Italy also shows large
productivity gains, but Italian mines represent a tiny fraction of ECSC coal
production. There is, however, no clear change after 1958 for France and Bel-
gium. Even though both countries experience some productivity gains over
the period, the end of the transition period does not seem to be associated
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FIGURE 1.7: Evolution of coalfield productivity countries
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SOURCES: Statistiques Hebdomadaires published by the Statistics Division of the High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community.
with larger gains. These figures suggest that taxation had a deterrent effect
on productivity, whereas the effect of subsidies seems to be ambiguous.
In order to test the differential effect of taxes and subsidies in ECSC coal-
fields, I run the following specification:
yict = ↵ +  .Taxict +  .Subsidyict +Xt + ⌫c + ✏it (1.3)
The coefficients of interest are  , which measures the effect of taxes on pro-
ductivity, and  , which measure the effect of subsidies.20 All specifications in-
clude country or area fixed effects (⌫c), and I check that including a quadratic
20Taxes and subsidies are measured yearly at the country level.
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time trend or year fixed effects do not change the results. I chose to include
the total amount of subsidies instead of per-unit measures, as state aids are
often distributed as a lump sum. I also decided to analyze the contemporane-
ous effect of taxes and subsidies on outcomes (as opposed to lagged effects),
since the ECSC perequation system was intended as a transitory policy, that
should have a direct impact on productivity.
Finally, I also investigate the channels that may explain how coalfields
increased their productivity. Coalfields have two main options to increase
productivity: they can rationalize production or they can invest in new pro-
duction technology. In order to rationalize production in the coal industries,
firms can close the least efficient sites, which have the highest marginal cost of
production. Figure 1.8 shows the evolution of active sites in ECSC countries:
the total number of actives sites decreased from 474 in 1953 to 272 in 1964,
but there is only a clear break in trend after 1958 for Belgium, which closed
45 sites between 1957 and 1960 (from 120 to 75).
Firms can also invest in more efficient production technologies. Figure 1.9
shows the evolution of the amounts invested per active site between 1953 and
1964. There is no clear break in trend, but the figure suggests that investments
tended to decrease over time in Belgium and France, whereas they increased
in Germany. In order to analyze precisely the effect of taxes and subsidies,
I run the same specifications as Equation 1.3, where the outcome variable is
the number of active sites or the yearly investments per active site.
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FIGURE 1.8: Evolution of the number of Active Sites in ECSC Coalfields
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FIGURE 1.9: Investments per Active Sites in ECSC Coalfields (Value)
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NOTES: Series have been smoothed using running-mean smoothing.
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1.5 Results and interpretation
In this section, I show how the transition period affected coalfields’ produc-
tivity. Furthermore, I show that taxes significantly deterred mines to make
productive investments, thereby increasing their productivity. Finally, sub-
sidies also failed to significantly increase investment and productivity of the
recipient mines. I discuss these results, explaining why the High Authority did
not succeed in giving Belgian mines the adequate incentives to make the pro-
ductive investments that would allow them to face fierce competition within
the common market for coal.
1.5.1 Results
The impact of the end of the transition period
The main estimation strategy I first perform the difference-in-difference
regression using the yearly UK and ECSC samples. Table 1.5 shows the result
of the basic specification, with country and year fixed effects (column (1)).
The end of the transition period is associated with a significant increase of
productivity of 1.217 weekly tons per worker, which corresponds to a 18 per-
cent increase compared to the average productivity in ECSC in 1954. These
results are robust to the inclusion of area fixed effects (Column (2)).21 Results
are unchanged if the smallest coalfields are excluded (Columns (3) and (4))
and when Belgium is left out of the sample (Columns (5) and (6)).
21Standard errors are robust, but not clustered, as the number of clusters is too small to
apply standard clustering methods.
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TABLEAU 1.5: Effect of the end of the transition period on productivity
in ECSC coalfields - Annual ECSC and UK Samples (1954-1962)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 1958 1.217*** 1.217*** 1.265*** 1.265*** 1.229*** 1.229***
in ECSC (0.402) (0.132) (0.436) (0.115) (0.413) (0.413)
Year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country f.e. YES NO YES NO YES NO
Coalfield f.e. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Obs. 234 234 180 180 216 216
R2 0.514 0.916 0.486 0.957 0.514 0.913
NOTES: Dependent variable is the average weekly productivity per worker over the year in each coalfield. The sample
in columns (1) and (2) comprises all coalfields; the sample in columns (3) and (4) exclude coalfields which produce
less than 1 percent of total ECSC production ; the sample in columns (5) and (6) excludes Belgium. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
Robustness check I then analyze the differential effect of the end of the
transition period using the weekly data on productivity in ECSC coalfields, in
order to check whether the post-1958 increase in productivity was driven by
coalfields’ strategic decisions (and rule out the effect of an exogenous techno-
logical shock, which would have affected all the ECSC coalfields in a similar
way).
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show the results of the specification that includes an
interaction between the variable indicating the end of the transition period
in ECSC countries and a proxy for coal demand in the area. In Table 1.6,
the proxy for coal demand is steel production in each coalfield’s area. The
coefficient has the expected sign and is significant in all specifications, with
country fixed effects (column (1)) and coalfield fixed effects (column (2)).
In my preferred specification, which includes coalfield fixed effects, the co-
efficient is equal to 0.0524. This means that an increase in steel demand in
the area by 13,000t (which correspond to the differential in demand between
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coalfields located in the Ruhr/Aachen area and coalfields located in the Cen-
tre of France) yields to an increase in productivity of 0.68t per worker after
the end of the transition period. The coefficients increases slightly to 0.0749
when small coalfields are excluded from the analysis (columns (3) and (4)),
and remains unchanged when Belgium is left out of the sample (columns (5)
and (6)).
TABLEAU 1.6: Differential effect of the end of the transition period on
productivity by level of steel demand in the area - Weekly ECSC sample
(1954-1962)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 1958 0.0518*** 0.0524*** 0.0737*** 0.0749*** 0.0546*** 0.0554***
x Steel production (0.00706) (0.00337) (0.00686) (0.00335) (0.00747) (0.00342)
Year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country f.e. YES NO YES NO YES NO
Coalfield f.e. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Obs. 8,040 8,040 5,387 5,387 7,151 7,151
R2 0.494 0.810 0.409 0.868 0.505 0.803
NOTES: Dependent variable is the weekly productivity per worker in each coalfield. Steel production in the area in 1952
is used as a proxy for coal demand.The sample in columns (1) and (2) comprises all coalfields; the sample in columns
(3) and (4) exclude coalfields which produce less than 1 percent of total ECSC production; the sample in columns (5)
and (6) excludes Belgium. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
The results are qualitatively similar when I use the index of steel demand
instead of demand in the area (Table 1.7), but the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients is smaller. In the specification including coalfields fixed effects (column
(2)), the coefficient is equal to 0.0108. For an increase in aggregate steel
demand by around 24,000t (which corresponds roughly to the difference be-
tween coalfields located in the Ruhr/Aachen area and coalfields located in
the Centre of France), the increase in productivity would be around 0.26t
per worker. Excluding the smallest coalfields yields similar results. These re-
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TABLEAU 1.7: Differential effect of the end of the transition period on
productivity using an aggregate index of steel demand - Weekly ECSC
sample (1954-1962)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 1958 x 0.0110*** 0.0108*** 0.0119*** 0.0121*** 0.0142*** 0.0143***
ISD (0.00256) (0.00173) (0.00302) (0.00175) (0.00283) (0.00184)
Year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country f.e. YES NO YES NO YES NO
Coalfield f.e. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Obs. 8,040 8,040 5,387 5,387 7,151 7,151
R2 0.559 0.808 0.504 0.860 0.554 0.801
NOTES: Dependent variable is the weekly productivity per worker in each coalfield. Index of steel demand takes into
account a weighted sum of steel production in 1952 within 400 km of each area (see text for further explanations).
The sample in columns (1) and (2) comprises all coalfields; the sample in columns (3) and (4) exclude coalfields which
produce less than 1 percent of total ECSC production; the sample in columns (5) and (6) excludes Belgium. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
sults confirm the fact that the post-1958 increase in productivity was driven
by coalfields’ unilateral strategic decisions, and rule out the alternative hy-
pothesis that this significant increase in productivity would be caused by any
macroeconomic or technical change.
The differential impact of taxes and subsidies on coalfields’ productiv-
ity
The last set of results shows the differential effect of taxes and subsidies on
productivity. It also specifies how both taxes and subsidy impact coalfields’
rationalization and investment decisions.
Table 1.8 shows that taxes and subsidies both negatively affects weekly
productivity in ECSC coalfields. These effects are significant in all specifi-
cations, without time effects (column (1)), including a quadratic time trend
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(column (2)), or controlling for time effects with a full set of year dummies
(column (3)). The results are also robust to the exclusion of the smallest
coalfields (column (4)), and of Belgium (column (5)) from the sample. The
fact that estimates are unaffected by the exclusion of Belgium, which received
state aids throughout the entire period, suggests that the results are mainly
driven by the end of the perequation system. Coefficients from my preferred
specification (column (3)), which include area and time effects, suggest that
a $10m tax decreases productivity by about 1, and a $10m subsidy decreases
productivity by approximately 0.4.
TABLEAU 1.8: Effect of taxes and subsidies on productivity in ECSC coal-
fields
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Taxes -0.000160*** -8.00e-05*** -9.70e-05*** -6.53e-05*** -0.000113***
(3.89e-06) (5.72e-06) (5.84e-06) (4.32e-06) (6.54e-06)
Subsidies -6.82e-05*** -3.30e-05*** -4.06e-05*** -1.18e-05*** -5.29e-05***
(1.10e-06) (2.75e-06) (2.95e-06) (1.89e-06) (3.45e-06)
Coalfield f.e. YES YES YES YES YES
Quadratic time trend NO YES NO NO NO
Year f.e. NO NO YES YES YES
Obs. 8,040 8,040 8,040 5,387 7,151
R2 0.733 0.811 0.817 0.865 0.814
NOTES: Dependent variable is the average weekly productivity per worker over the year in each coalfield between 1954
and 1962. The sample in columns (1) to (3) comprises all ECSC coalfields; the sample in column (4) exclude coalfields
which produce less than 1 percent of total ECSC production and the sample in column (5) excludes Belgium. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
Next, I investigate whether taxes and subsidies have an impact on the ra-
tionalization of coal mines, as measured by the number of active sites. Results,
presented in Table 1.9, show that neither taxes and subsidies seem to have any
significant effect on the closing of active sites, once I control for time effects
(column (2) and (3)). Excluding Belgium does not change this result.
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Finally, I analyze the impact of taxes and subsidies on the level of invest-
ment per active site. Table 1.10 shows a clear negative impact of taxes on
investment, whereas the effect of subsidies is never significant. The effect
on taxes is robust to the inclusion of a quadratic time trend (column (2) or
year dummies (column (3)). Excluding Belgium reduces the sample and de-
creases precision, but the negative effect of taxes is still significant at the 10
percent level. These results suggest that subsidies were not used for produc-
tive investment during the transition period. On the other hand, as expected,
taxes levied through the perequation system had a clear negative impact on
investment decisions.
TABLEAU 1.9: Effect of taxes and subsidies on the number of active sites
in ECSC countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes 0.000673 7.07e-05 0.000163 0.000496
(0.00148) (0.00172) (0.00179) (0.00176)
Subsidies 0.000636* 0.000340 0.000375 0.000287
(0.000365) (0.000559) (0.000548) (0.000607)
Country f.e. YES YES YES YES
Quadratic time trend NO YES NO NO
Year f.e. NO NO YES YES
Obs. 121 121 121 99
R2 0.127 0.133 0.133 0.119
NOTES: Dependent variable is the number of active site in broadly defined coalfields between 1953 and 1963. Col-
umn (1) to (3) includes all ECSC countries, column (4) excludes Belgium. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
45
Three Essays in Competition Policy
TABLEAU 1.10: Effect of taxes and subsidies on investment per active
site in ECSC countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes -4.30e-05*** -3.79e-05** -5.20e-05** -4.12e-05*
(7.13e-06) (1.48e-05) (2.51e-05) (2.22e-05)
Subsidies 1.75e-05 2.12e-05 1.92e-05 1.49e-05
(1.20e-05) (1.42e-05) (1.47e-05) (1.45e-05)
Country f. e. YES YES YES YES
Quadratic time trend NO YES NO NO
Year f. e. NO NO YES YES
Obs. 121 121 121 99
R2 0.119 0.122 0.140 0.183
NOTES: Dependent variable is investment per active site in large coalfields (in value) between 1953 and 1963. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) to (3) includes all ECSC countries, column (4) excludes Belgium. Significance:
⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1.
1.5.2 Discussion
There are two main reasons that may explain why the subsidies granted to the
less efficient mines failed to increase productive investments and therefore to
enhance productivity.
First, the Belgian mines could expect to stay eligible for future financial
support if they remained less efficient than other ECSC coalfields. Therefore,
Belgian coalfields were not given the correct incentives to rationalize their
production process and make the necessary productive investments. There is
historical evidence that these subsidies were not invested in order to increase
productivity and prepare Belgian coalfields to compete within the Common
Market. For instance, in February 1959, the Belgian Prime Minister admitted
that the subsidies were not used to take the necessary reorganization mea-
sures and increase the productivity of Belgian mines. 22 In 1959, a few news-
22Les difficultés du marché charbonnier - Commentaires et Critiques, Assemblée Parlementaire
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papers criticized the “negligence” of the past Belgian Governments regarding
the rationalization of the Belgian mines.23 The Belgian Dutch-speaking daily
newspaper De Tijd, dated February 19, 1959, clearly assessed that the Belgian
mine owners allocated the subsidies that they were granted to by the Dutch
and German mines from 1955 to 1957 to directly compensate their high pro-
duction costs instead of making the requested productive investments.
Second, both the Belgian State and the High Authority were probably not
credible enough in 1954 to commit to cease the subsidies in 1958 if the Bel-
gian mines were not ready to compete on the merits within the Common
Market for coal and steel. In 1958, the Belgian State could not accept to
cease the subsidies, which would have considerably reduced its home coal
production. This explains why the Belgian State provided its less efficient
mines with financial support even after the end of the transition period, even
though such a decision went against the ECSC Treaty. The subsidies granted
to Belgian mines in the 1950s is an example of dynamic inconsistency. Putting
a definitive end to the subsidies in 1958 was not a politically acceptable so-
lution, even though it was a necessary condition to induce the Belgian mines
to make the needed productive investments during the transition period. This
illustrates the fact that the institution that provides short-term subsidies must
be able to commit to put a definitive end to the aids whatever the situation of
the recipient.
Européenne, January-March 1959, p. 8.
23See for instance, De Nieuwe Gids dated February 17 and 22, 1959; Het Parool, dated
February 18; or the Dutch newspaper De Nederlandse industrie, dated March 1, 1959.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the subsidy system implemented by the High Author-
ity of the ECSC deterred coalfields form increasing their productivity. I use
coalfields in the UK, which were not affected by the policy changes in ECSC
countries, as a control group to precisely capture the effect of the end of the
transition period. The perequation system did not have the expected effects. It
failed to encourage the less efficient mines to make the necessary investments
to face fierce competition. As the Commission of the European Communities
mentions, the objective of the transition period was to “operate the investments
of rationalization in order to allow the coal producers to integrate the common
market without artificial safe harbors.”24 It concludes that “the steps taken
towards modernizing the coalfields were limited.”25
The conclusion of this paper goes further the historical example of the
ECSC. I show that short-term taxes levied on productive firms have a clear de-
terrent effect both on their investments and productivity. Furthermore, short-
term subsidies, which are still a popular industrial policy do not always give
firms incentive to make productivity-increasing investments. More precisely,
there are two main reasons why the subsidies granted to ECSC coalfields did
not end up increasing mine productivity. First, subsidies were designed in
such a way that only the least efficient mines were granted some financial
support. This clearly distorted incentives to make productivity-increasing in-
vestments. On the contrary, mines were given incentives to stay less produc-
tive in order to remain eligible for financial support. Furthermore, the level
of the subsidy depended on the level of the marginal cost of the eligible mine.
A productivity-increasing investment, which precisely consists in decreasing
2425 ans de marché commun du charbon, p.74, Author’s translation.
2525 ans de marché commun du charbon, p.74, Author’s translation.
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marginal cost, would have implied a lower future subsidy – if any. Second,
efficient subsidy policies raise the well-identified issue of time-consistency of
optimal plans: the institution has to be able to commit to cease the finan-
cial support even though the recipient is still less efficient than its rivals. The
example of the transition period carried out by the ECSC shows that the cred-
ibility of the institution (generally the State) that provides financial support
to firms is a key element of the success of the policy.
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Appendix: Sources
Productivity data
1. ECSC: Statistiques Hebdomadaires published by the Statistics Division of
the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
2. UK: Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory published by the Na-
tional Coal Board.
Rapports généraux sur l’activité de la Communauté Most of the General
Reports on the Activity of the Community are available at the following ad-
dress:
http://aei.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/ecasc.html
1. Premier Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 10 August
1952 - 12 April 1953.
2. Deuxième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 13 April
1953 - 11 April 1954.
3. Troisième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 12 April
1954 - 10 April 1955.
4. Quatrième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 11 April
1955 - 8 April 1956.
5. Cinquième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 9 April
1956 - 13 April 1957.
6. Sixième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 13 April 1958.
Volume I: The policy of the High Authority & Volume II: The economic
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and social situation of the Community and the activity of the High Au-
thority.
7. Septième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1959.
8. Huitième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1959 - 31 January 1960.
9. Neuvième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1960 - 31 January 1961.
10. Dixième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1961 - 31 January 1962.
11. Onzième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1962 - 31 January 1963.
12. Douzième Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté: 1 February
1963 - 31 January 1964.
Financial Reports The financial reports contain detailled information on the
revenues and expenses related to the perequation system until 1958.
1. Rapport financier pour les années 1953 - 1954 - 1955, Commission Eu-
ropéenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, Division des Fi-
nances.
2. Exposé Général sur les Finances de la Communauté pendant l’exercice 1955
- 1956, Commission Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier.
3. Rapport financier pour l’année 1958, Comission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, Division des Finances.
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Investments The High Authority conducted specific investment surveys and
started to publish specific reports on this topic in 1956.
1. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1956, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, July 1956.
2. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1957, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, September 1957.
3. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1958, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, August 1958.
4. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1959, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, July 1959.
5. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1961, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, July 1961.
6. Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l’acier de la commu-
nauté - Rapport sur l’enquête 1965, Commission Européenne du Charbon
et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, July 1965.
Additional publications
1. Journal Officiel de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier,
available on the European Union website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).
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2. Bulletin Mensuel d’Information, Commission Européenne du Charbon et
de l’Acier, Haute Autorité.
3. La Formation Professionnelle dans les Houillères des Pays de la Commu-
nauté, Commission Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Haute Au-
torité, Mars 1956.
4. Les difficultés du Marché Charbonnier - Commentaires et Critiques, Assem-
blée Parlementaire Européenne, Janvier - Mars 1959.
5. 25 ans de Marché Commun du Charbon 1953-1978, Commission des
Communautés Européennes, 1977.
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CHAPTER 2
REPEATED PURCHASES, LOYALTY
REBATES, AND DEMAND
FORECLOSURE
2.1 Introduction1
Firms face heterogeneous customers. Demand often consists in recurrent buy-
ers, who purchase repeatedly, and occasional customers, who only buy once.
Typically, airlines serve both frequent travelers and tourists. It is also common
for producers to deal with retailers of various size. This paper analyses how
demand heterogeneity can allow an incumbent to implement loyalty rebates
(or discounts) that deny a rival scale, thereby profitably deterring efficient
entry.
Loyalty rebates are extremely common pricing strategies, which have be-
1I thank Larbi Alaoui, Claudio Calcagno, Gabrielle Fack, Chiara Fumagalli, Matthias
Hunold, Liliane Karlinger, Chrysovalantou Milliou, Massimo Motta, Anne Perrot, David Spec-
tor, Yossi Spiegel, and Thibaud Vergé, as well as seminar participants at Universitat Pompeu
Fabra (Barcelona, Spain), Centre for Competition Policy (Norwich, UK), 7th International
Conference on Competition and Regulation (CRESSE, Chania, Greece), 2013 MaCCI Annual
Conference (ZEW, Mannheim, Germany). The usual disclaimer applies.
55
Three Essays in Competition Policy
come an important topic in competition policy. In the US, they are often con-
sidered pro-competitive, as they tend to reduce prices and give retailers strong
incentives to increase downstream demand.2 Under European law, there is an
important distinction between “standardized” discounts, which are based on
generally applicable sale thresholds, and “individualized” rebates defined by
customer-specific sale targets.3 The former are presumed legal while the latter
are considered in most cases unlawful as they imply explicit (first-degree) dis-
crimination. Several cases like Intel,4 which was fined more than one billion
euro, or Deutsche Post5 precisely illustrate the fact that individualized rebates
can be granted in order to deprive an efficient rival of the scale it needs to
profitably enter the market.6
One of the main contributions of this paper is to show that, under demand
heterogeneity, loyalty rebates are always more profitable for the dominant
firm than independent pricing, as they allow the incumbent either to prevent
the efficient rival from entering the market or to extract all or part of the
entrant’s rent. Moreover, I show that the incumbent can deter efficient en-
try by implementing a standardized rebate scheme, as it induces customers
to select themselves according to their type. Knowing each customer’s type
would not increase the profit that the incumbent can achieve granting stan-
dardized rebates. Furthermore, when the degree of demand heterogeneity is
too low to separate customers according to their types, the incumbent may
profitably grant the same loyalty rebate to all customers in order to deter en-
2See Kobayashi (2004) for a review of the most important US cases involving loyalty
rebates.
3See Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4071. For a detailed economic
analysis of the recent European case law, see O’Donoghue et Padilla (2006).
4European Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.990, 13 May 2009 (“Intel”).
5European Commission Decision COMP/35.141, 20 March 2001 (“Deutsche Post”).
6See e.g. “Deutsche Post:” “By granting fidelity rebates to its biggest partners, [Deutsche
Post] has deliberately prevented competitors from reaching the “critical mass” of some 100 mil-
lion in annual turnover,” which is required for successful entry (§37).
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try. Finally, I show that optimal entry-deterrent discounts are characterized
by a first-period list price above the monopoly price and a second-period dis-
counted price below the incumbent’s marginal cost. This particularly high
first-period price balances the low second-period one, thereby allowing the
incumbent to profitably deter entry. This pricing scheme is commonly imple-
mented in practice: the subscription business model, for instance, precisely
consists in setting an initial fixed fee in exchange for the long-period provision
of a good at a very low (if not zero) price. This pricing strategy diametrically
differs from other exclusionary practices, which generally amounts to charge
very low first-period prices, either to directly deter entry (predation) or to
preempt demand (exclusive dealing) before charging monopoly prices when
enjoying the leveraged dominant position. In an extension of the basic model,
I show that, when customer heterogeneity is limited, exclusion can be driven
by “buyer opportunism:” customers buy unneeded units of the good from the
incumbent in order to benefit from the rebates.
Ties to the literature To my knowledge, the anticompetitive consequences
of such optimal loyalty rebates have never been studied in the literature. How-
ever, this paper is directly related to both seminal papers on exclusive dealing
contracts by Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal et Whinston (2000) (hence-
forth RRW and SW). As RRW and SW, I assume that the efficient rival must
serve a minimum number of customers to recoup its fixed entry cost.7 How-
ever, my work differs from these two papers in many respects. First, in RRW
and SW’s models, customers’ preferences are assumed to be symmetric. In my
7Following RRW and SW, various other papers are based on this assumption. Carlton et
Waldman (2002) and Fumagalli et Motta (2009) respectively analyze bundling and preda-
tion, in a setting where there are “occasional” customers only. Fumagalli et Motta (2006) dis-
cuss the consequences of competition amongst buyers in RRW’s and SW’s framework. Spector
(2011) adapts such a model to the situation where the incumbent excludes a more efficient
firm already active on the market, by proposing exclusive dealing contracts to symmetric
customers.
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model, profitable entry deterrence comes from customer heterogeneity. Sec-
ond, RRW and SW consider exclusive dealing contracts: foreclosure results
from customer preemption. Loyalty rebates do not imply customer preemp-
tion as the rival, if it decides to enter, can serve all second-period customers.
Buyers simply observe prices and decide which firm to purchase from, with-
out having to comply with any contract. Therefore, customers do not need to
commit and have no incentive to renegotiate their pricing conditions. Finally,
conditions for successful entry deterrence also differ. In this paper, customers’
miscoordination is not a necessary condition for profitable entry deterrence,
and there is no need for the incumbent to explicitly discriminate amongst
customers in order to profitably prevent the efficient firm from entering the
market.
This paper is also related to the economic literature on rebates. Kar-
linger et Motta (2012) study whether pure quantity discounts can have entry-
deterrent effects and show that explicit (i.e., first-degree) price discrimination
is more effective to deter entry than uniform pricing. However, if entry occurs,
explicit discrimination achieves the highest level of welfare. There is there-
fore a trade-off for the regulator between maximizing the chances of entry
and maximizing consumer welfare. In their paper, as in RRW’s, entry deter-
rence results from customers’ miscoordination. Federico et Régibeau (2012)
show that rebates can significantly distort competition in a situation where
asymmetric firms sell their products through an intermediary who can favor
a firm over the other. However, as the authors point out, foreclosure crucially
results from the role played by the recipients of the incentive payments, and
their findings cannot be directly applied “to cases where rebates are paid to
final or intermediate consumers (which is typically the case when one deals with
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loyalty discounts).”8 Karlinger (2012) shows that rebates can be granted by a
dominant upstream firm in order to control retailer competition: the incum-
bent can design a rebate scheme to accommodate entry, as in Aghion et Bolton
(1987). Rebates allow it to secure its profit and to reduce the rents that its
rivals could extract from the retailers. Similarly, I show that loyalty rebates
allow the incumbent to extract part or all of the rival’s rent but, if the incum-
bent’s marginal cost is lower than a given threshold, entry deterrence is more
profitable than entry accommodation. Finally, Choné et Linnemer (2013) ana-
lyze an exclusionary scenario for quantity rebates and market share discounts
when the buyer and the incumbent do not know ex ante the quality of the
good. The incumbent can design a rebate offer in order to extract all or part
of its rival’s rent. Choné et Linnemer (2013) introduce the idea of “buyer op-
portunism:” the buyer might buy unneeded units of the good with the sole
purpose of pocketing rebates. In their model, this strategy is never seen in
equilibrium. On the contrary, I show that, when it is not too costly for a cus-
tomer to purchase additional units in period 1 in order to benefit from the
rebate in period 2, buyer opportunism leads to entry deterrence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 discusses the main results, focusing on the optimality of the pricing
scheme and the conditions for successful entry deterrence, and Section 4 con-
cludes.
2.2 Optimal loyalty rebates
This section presents the baseline model, where first-period demand struc-
ture consists in both recurrent and occasional customers. I show that the
8Federico et Régibeau (2012), p. 3.
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incumbent can accommodate or deter entry by implementing an optimal re-
bate scheme such that first-period customers select themselves according to
their type (i.e., implicit or second-degree discrimination).
2.2.1 The model
I consider a two-period game where an incumbent (I) and a potential entrant
(E) produce a homogenous good, and face the same number N of customers
in each period (N   2). Amongst these customers, R are recurrent buyers –
as they periodically buy one unit of good (R   1), and N   R are occasional
customers, who only buy once. The type of a customer (i.e., recurrent or
occasional) is private information. Each customer demands one unit of good
for any price weakly lower than v = 1.9
In period 1, the incumbent, which enjoys monopoly power, proposes a
menu of prices M = {(p, p); pI1} to all first-period customers, where p and p
(p > p) define the rebate offer; p (resp. p) is to be paid in period 1 (resp. in
period 2); and pI1 is the stand-alone first-period price. In other words, a first-
period customer is offered the choice between purchasing one unit at a price
pI1 or buying it at a price p, which gives him the opportunity to buy another
unit in period 2 at a discounted price p. I assume non-negative prices.10
Customer i’s intertemporal utility, when accepting the rebate offer, is de-
noted U i(r) = U i(p, p) = (1  p) +  (1  p). Similarly, ⇧I = ⇧I1 +  ⇧I2 is Firm
9All the findings remain when considering a linear demand function: there is a minimum
quantity q that needs to be purchased by recurrent customers in period 1 in order to benefit
from the rebate scheme.
10Assuming negative discounted prices would be a way to model retroactive (or all-unit)
rebates, which are discounts granted on all units conditional on reaching a given quantity or
expenditure threshold. In such a case, it can thus be cheaper for a customer to increase the
quantity he purchases in order to reach the threshold. I restrict my attention to situations
where the total price charged to customers is weakly increasing with the quantity purchased.
Allowing for negative discounted prices (i.e., retractive rebates) would make entry deterrence
even easier.
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I ’s intertemporal profit, where ⇧It (t = {1, 2}) is its profit in period t.   is a
discount factor; I assume non-myopic agents (1     > 0).
Firm E decides whether or not to enter the market in period 2. If it enters,
both firms compete à la Bertrand. Firm E’s marginal cost is strictly lower than
the incumbent’s (cE = 0 < cI < 1). If it enters, Firm E has to incur a sunk
fixed entry cost f , which can be recouped only if it serves a minimum number
of second-period customers equal to N +1: N is therefore the greatest integer
such that
NcI < f < NcI . (A1)
This assumption ensures that (i) it is profitable for Firm E to enter the market
if it can serve at least N + 1 customers as Firm E’s profit when entering the
market is given by ⇧E = (N+1)pE f = (N+1)cI f , which is non negative,
and (ii) Firm E’s entry is socially beneficial.
Finally, I assume that (i) first-period customers’ choices are public informa-
tion in period 2, and (ii) the entrant is free to explicitly discriminate amongst
second-period customers. These last two assumptions make entry deterrence
much more difficult because they allow the entrant to undercut p and charge
a higher price to customers who do not benefit from the rebate offer.
The timeline of the game is as follows.
1. First period.
i. Firm I proposes a menu of non-negative pricesM = {(p, p); pI1}.
ii. Each customer decides whether or not to buy one unit of good. If he
decides to buy one unit from the incumbent, he has to choose be-
tween accepting the rebate offer and paying the stand-alone price
pI1. Finally, first-period transactions take place.
2. Second period.
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i. Firm E decides whether or not to enter the market, knowing first-
period customers’ choices, which are public information.
ii. Firm E, if it decided to enter, and Firm I simultaneously set second-
period prices (pI2 and pE). Recurrent customers who accepted the
rebate offer and paid p in period 1 can buy another unit in period
2 at a price p.
iii. Buyers decide from which firm to buy, and second-period transac-
tions take place.
2.2.2 Independent pricing
As a baseline, I consider the benchmark situation in which the incumbent does
not implement any rebate scheme. This situation also corresponds to the case
in which there is no recurrent customer (R = 0). The two periods of the game
are therefore independent and can be analyzed as two different games.
During the first period, the incumbent charges p˜I1 = 1 to each first-period
customer, and gets a first-period profit ⇧˜I1 = N(1  cI).
During the second period, Firm E decides to enter the market. Both firms
simultaneously set p˜E = p˜I2 = cI , Firm E serves all second-period customers,
and makes a profit ⇧˜E = NcI   f > 0.
2.2.3 Definition: “Standardized” vs. “individualized” re-
bates
A firm implements a standardized rebate scheme when it proposes the same
rebate offer to all customers (whether each customer accepts it or not). An
individualized rebate scheme would allow the incumbent to restrict to any n⇤
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(n⇤ < N) the number of rebates (p, p) that it proposes to first-period cus-
tomers.
2.2.4 Analysis
Optimal partially exclusionary standardized rebates I show that an op-
timal loyalty rebate is defined by a high first-period price and a low second-
period one. The incumbent can thus implement such a rebate in order to
benefit from the high first-period price and let the efficient entrant provide
the good at a reduced price in period 2. Therefore, the incumbent can grant a
rebate offer in order to accommodate entry and extract all or part of its rival’s
rent.11
Partially exclusionary rebates always yield a higher profit than indepen-
dent pricing. Proposition 1 formally presents this result. Recall that N + 1 is
the minimum number of customers that Firm I needs to serve in order to be
able to recoup its fixed entry cost. I define N⇤ = N  N , where N is the total
number of customers to be served in each period.
Proposition 1. The incumbent can implement a rebate offer in order to ac-
commodate entry for any R > 0, N   2, cI , and f that satisfy (A1). Entry
accommodation is always more profitable than independent pricing.
1. If R < N⇤, the optimal menu of prices that Firm I can implement in order
to accommodate entry is given by M⇤ =  (1 +  (cI   ✏), ✏); 1 , where ✏ is
strictly positive and tends to 0. In period 1, all recurrent customers choose
the rebate offer, while all occasional customers choose to pay the stand-
alone price p⇤I1 = 1. Firm I ’s profit is ⇧EAI t N(1 cI)+ RcI . In period 2,
11Aghion et Bolton (1987) show that exclusionary contracts can be used to extract their
rival’s rent. However, a striking difference with Aghion’s and Bolton’s paper is that exclusion
would never take place in the deterministic version of their model. Exclusion may only take
place when there is uncertainty about the efficiency of the entrant, which is not the case here
(see Proposition 2).
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Firm E decides to enter, charges p
E
= ✏ to the recurrent customers, pE = cI
to the occasional customers, and gets a profit ⇧EAE t (N  R)cI   f .
2. If R   N⇤, the optimal menu of prices that Firm I can implement in order
to accommodate entry is given by M⇤ =  (1 +  (cI   ),); 1 , where
 = 1R [f   (N  R)cI ]. Firm I ’s profit is given by ⇧EAI = N(1  cI) +  ⇢E,
where ⇢E = NcI   f is Firm E’s rent. In period 2, Firm E decides to
enter, charge p
E
=  to the recurrent customers, pE = cI to the occasional
customers, and makes no profit: ⇧EAE = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
As Proposition 1 shows, two cases can be distinguished. If the number of
recurrent customers is low (R < N), the entrant can recoup its fixed entry
cost only serving second-period occasional customers. Therefore, the incum-
bent can only extract the share of Firm E’s rent that comes from recurrent
customers’ second-period purchases. If the number of recurrent customers is
high (R   N), the incumbent can extract Firm E’s entire rent (⇢E) by charg-
ing a discounted price (p) such that the total amount paid by second-period
customers equals the entrant’s fixed entry cost.
Optimal entry-deterrent standardized rebates I show that there is a set
of optimal standardized rebates that allows the incumbent to deter entry if
(i) there is at least one occasional customer, and (ii) the number of recurrent
customers is high enough. Moreover, I show that entry deterrence is more
profitable than entry accommodation if the number of recurrent customer is
low enough: R < N(cI) = (1 2cI)N+f1 cI . An equivalent condition is that Firm I ’s
marginal cost is lower than a given threshold: cI < cI = N R+f2N R .
Optimal entry-deterrent rebates, like partially exclusionary ones, are char-
acterized by a very high first-period price (p), which allows the incumbent to
64
Chap. 2
commit to a very low second-period price (p). The high first-period price of
the rebate offer is greater than customers’ willingness to pay for one unit of
good (p > 1), while the second-period reduced price is lower than Firm I ’s
marginal cost (p < cI). The first-period price thus balances the second-period
one, thereby considerably increasing the profitability of entry deterrence.
Furthermore, the menu of pricesM = {(p, p); pI1} is incentive compatible
because no first-period occasional customer would be willing to pay p knowing
that he has no interest in buying an additional unit of good in Period 2.
Proposition 2 formally presents this result. Recall that N⇤ equals N   N ,
and N(cI) = (1 2cI)N+f1 cI .
Proposition 2. The game described above has the following pure-strategy subgame-
perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibria, for any R > 0, N   2, cI , and f that
satisfy (A1).
1. If N⇤  R < N(cI), the incumbent implements a rebate offer (p⇤, p⇤) accepted
by all recurrent customers so as to prevent Firm E from entering the market
in period 2. In period 1, Firm I sets
M⇤ =  (1 +  (cI   ),); 1 , where  2 ⇥0, 1R [f   (N   R)cI ] , all re-
current customers choose the rebate offer, while all occasional customers
choose to pay the stand-alone price p⇤I1 = 1. In period 2, Firm I charges
p⇤I2 = 1, all second-period customers buy from the incumbent and entry
does not occur.
2. Otherwise, the incumbent implements a partially exclusionary rebate scheme,
as described in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Interpretation of the results Optimal rebates are characterized by the joint
optimization of p and p, which considerably reduces the cost of entry de-
terrence and entry accommodation because the particularly high first-period
price balances the entry-deterrent low second-period price. This explains why
entry deterrence and entry accommodation are possible even if the entrant’s
fixed cost is low.
Entry deterrence is more profitable than entry accommodation when Firm
I ’s marginal cost is lower than a given threshold cI , which depends on the
number of recurrent customers. The number of recurrent customers must
be high enough to allow the incumbent to deter entry. However, when it
increases, the incumbent grants a large number of standardized rebates: a
significant share of second-period customers therefore pays the discounted
price in period 2, and entry deterrence becomes less profitable. When R =
N⇤, entry deterrence is more profitable than entry accommodation if Firm I ’s
marginal cost is below N/N , which is the ratio of the minimum number of
customers that the entrant must serve to profitably enter the market over the
total number of customers. When R = N⇤+n, for any integer n  N   1, this
ratio equals (N   n)/(N   n).
There is a set of optimal entry-deterrent rebates. The incumbent is indeed
indifferent between any p and p for which p +  p = 1 +  cI , as long as these
prices prevent Firm E from entering the market (i.e., Rp+ (N  R)cI < f).
Entry deterrence is possible even if there is customer miscoordination. In
other words, customers do not have a joint interest in refusing the rebate offer
in order to let Firm E enter the market.
The incumbent does not need to know ex ante each customer’s type to
profitably deter entry. Entry deterrence and entry accommodation are based
on implicit discrimination amongst first-period customers, who self select de-
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pending on their type. The optimal menu of prices is incentive compatible.
Thus, knowing the type of each first-period customer and allowing for explicit
discrimination would not increase the profit that the incumbent can achieve
granting standardized rebates.
Entry deterrence occurs only if the value of the discount factor   is strictly
positive. If recurrent customers were perfectly myopic, they would behave as
occasional customers and they would not accept the rebate in the first place.
The value of the discount factor, as long as it is strictly positive, does not affect
the incumbent’s ability to accommodate entry or to prevent the efficient rival
from entering the market. However, the higher the discount factor the larger
the incumbent’s benefit from entry deterrence or entry accommodation.
Firms frequently implement such rebate schemes. For instance, airlines or
railway companies often propose costly loyalty cards in order to select recur-
rent customers. Some firms also offer to their largest retailers to be “official
dealers.” In such a case, the dealer has to pay an important lump-sum fee
to the producer in order to benefit from significant rebates. The subscription
business model, adopted in many industries, also consists in charging an ini-
tial fixed fee for a long-period access to the product or service at a very low
(if not zero) price.
2.3 Discussion
This section discusses the conditions for successful entry deterrence. More
precisely, I show that entry deterrence can also occur (i) when the incumbent
does not discriminate (even implicitly) amongst first-period customers, and
(ii) when it serves heterogenous recurrent customers only.
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2.3.1 Non-discriminatory entry-deterrent loyalty rebates
Proposition 2 states that the optimal entry-deterrent pricing scheme is such
that the first-period price is greater than a customer’s willingness to pay (p >
1). This high first-period price allows the incumbent to implicitly discriminate
amongst first-period customers because only recurrent customers would be
willing to accept it in exchange for a low second-period price. This simple
pricing policy is currently implemented by firms that face both recurrent and
occasional customers.
However, non-discriminatory loyalty rebates are also extremely common,
and one may wonder whether entry deterrence is still possible when granting
a rebate offer that can be accepted by all (recurrent and occasional) first-
period customers – that is imposing pI1 = p. In such a case, the incumbent no
longer discriminates (even implicitly) amongst customers.
I show that, under certain conditions, the incumbent can deter entry grant-
ing non-discriminatory entry-deterrent loyalty rebates. Proposition 3 formally
presents this result. Recall that N⇤ equals N  N , and N(cI) = (1 2cI)N+f1 cI .
Proposition 3. Imposing pI1 = p, the game described above has the following
pure-strategy subgame-perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibria, for any R > 0,
N   2, cI , and f that satisfy (A1).
1. If N⇤  R < N(cI), the incumbent can implement a rebate offer (p⇤, p⇤)
accepted by all recurrent customers so as to prevent Firm E from entering
the market in period 2. In period 1, Firm I sets
M⇤ =
n 
1, 1R
⇥
f   (N  R)cI
⇤  ✏ ; 1o, for a strictly positive ✏ that tends
to zero. All first-period customers choose the rebate offer. Firm I charges
p⇤I2 = 1 to second-period occasional customers, all second-period customers
buy from the incumbent and entry does not occur.
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2. Otherwise, the incumbent does not implement any non-discriminatory rebate
offer in period 1, and sets p⇤I1 = 1. In period 2, prices are given by p⇤I2 =
p⇤E = cI , all second-period customers buy from the entrant, ⇧E = NcI f >
0, and entry occurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
All first-period customers choose the rebate offer. The incumbent can prof-
itably deter entry because the reduced second-period price, which makes entry
deterrence costly, is payed by recurrent customers only. The non-discrimination
restriction (pI1 = p) does not allow the incumbent to accommodate entry as
it implies that the first-period profit equals the benchmark situation profit
(⇧˜I1 = N(1  cI)).
An important implication of Proposition 3 is that the incumbent no longer
needs to implement a menu of prices. A single rebate offer (p, p) allows it to
profitably deter entry. In other words, the menuM⇤ =  (1,); 1 is equivalent
to the rebate offer r⇤ = (1,).
It is much costlier for the incumbent to implement a non-discriminatory
rebate scheme than an implicitly discriminatory one. Indeed, Firm I ’s profit
when granting non-discriminatory rebates is ⇧NDI = N(1 cI)+ 
⇥
(N R)(1 
cI) + (f   NcI)
⇤
and ⇧⇤I = N(1   cI) +  (N   R)(1   cI), when it implicitly
discriminates amongst first-period customers. Hence, ⇧NDI  ⇧⇤I =  (f  NcI),
which is strictly negative. The first-period price of a non-discriminatory rebate
is constrained and cannot balance the necessary low second-period discounted
price.
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2.3.2 Entry deterrence without occasional customers
The presence of recurrent and occasional customers is a particular – albeit
common – demand structure. In this section, I first show that, absent any
occasional customers, the incumbent can grant individualized rebates to deter
entry. I then show that the pricing strategy described above can be profitably
implemented in order to prevent an efficient rival from entering the market
when the incumbent faces only recurrent customers with heterogeneous pref-
erences. In such a case, customer heterogeneity stems from the quantity they
purchase (and not whether they purchase or not in both periods, as in the
previous section).
2.3.2.1 Optimal entry-deterrent individualized rebates
Individualized rebates allow Firm I to deter entry even though it only faces
recurrent customers. n⇤ is the optimal number of rebates r⇤ that need to be
implemented so as to deter entry. Let assume that (i) there are R 2 [N⇤, N ] re-
current customers, and (ii) cI < cI = N n
⇤+f
2N n⇤ . Firm I can profitably deter entry
by restricting the number of rebate offers r⇤ = (p⇤, p⇤) as defined in Proposi-
tion 2 that it grants to n⇤ 2 [N⇤, N). In period 1, n⇤ recurrent customers i
therefore anticipates that Firm E has therefore no longer interest in entering
the market and accept the rebate offer as U i(r⇤) =  (1 cI) = U i(p˜I1, p˜E2). The
remaining R n⇤ recurrent customers j therefore accept Firm I ’s independent
prices (p⇤I1, p⇤I2) because U j(p⇤I1, p⇤I2) = 0 = U j(p⇤I1, p⇤E2).
The incumbent’s intertemporal profit ⇧I(n) = N(1  cI)+  (N  n)(1  cI)
is decreasing in n. The incumbent therefore seeks to minimize the number
of rebates it grants. The optimal number of entry-deterrent individualized
rebate offers is thus n⇤ = N⇤.
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2.3.2.2 Recurrent customer heterogeneity
I now consider recurrent customers only, whose heterogeneity comes from the
quantity they purchase in each period. This implies slight changes in the basic
model presented in Section 2.2.
The incumbent faces L large customers (or retailers), purchasing a quan-
tity ql in both periods, and N   L small customers, who buy a quantity qs
in each period, such that qs < ql. The total quantity purchased by all large
customers, Lql, is denoted Ql. Similarly, the total quantity purchased by all
small customers, (N  L)qs, is denoted Qs. The type of the customer (large or
small) is private information. Firm E’s fixed entry cost is strictly positive. It
can therefore be written as:
QcI = f < QcI , (A1’)
where Q > 0, and Q is the total demand (Q = Ql +Qs = Lql + (N   L)qs).
I show that the incumbent can grant entry-deterrent standardized rebates
defined by the menu of M⇤ =  (p, p); pI1 , where p and p are first- and
second-period unit prices charged to a customer who accepts to buy ql units in
period 1 (the rebate offer does not impose the purchase of a minimum quan-
tity of good in period 2), and pI1 is the unit price charged to the customer who
purchases a quantity qs.
Independent pricing The independent price benchmark is the same as in
Section 2.2.2: during the first period, the incumbent sets p˜I1 = 1 to each first-
period customer. It gets a first-period profit ⇧˜I1 = Q(1   cI). In the second
period, Firm E decides to enter the market. Both firms simultaneously set
p˜E = p˜I2 = cI , Firm E serves all second-period customers, and makes a profit
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⇧˜E = QcI   f > 0.
Entry accommodation and entry deterrence Entry deterrence is more prof-
itable than entry accommodation as long as (i) cI is lower than a given thresh-
old,12 and (ii) Qs < Q. The following two situations can be distinguished: (i)
when ql is significantly larger than qs, the incumbent can design an incentive-
compatible mechanism such that each first-period customer truthfully reveals
its type. This case is the same as in Section 2.2.4. (ii) When ql is close to qs,
small customers have an interest in pretending to be of the large type. They
thus decide to buy more than they would do absent any rebate scheme in pe-
riod 1 in exchange for a very low price in period 2; in this case, all first-period
customers accept the rebate offer.
Proposition 4 formally presents this result. In Proposition 4 below, Q(cI) =
Q Q
1 cI cI , Q˜(cI) = (N   L)ql  
 (Ql Q)cI
1 cI+ cI and  =
(1+ cI)ql (1+ )qs
 (ql qs) .
Proposition 4. The game described above has the following pure-strategy coalition-
proof Nash equilibria, for ql > qs > 0, L > 1, and for cI , and f that satisfy (A1’).
1. Entry deterrence:
(a) If ql > 1+ 1+ cI q
s, and Q > Qs > Q(cI), Firm I sets
M⇤ =   1 +  (cI   ), , 1 , where  2 h0,minn 1Ql (f  QscI), o⌘, large
customers accept the rebate offer, while small ones pay the stand-alone price
p⇤I1 = 1. In period 2, firms set p
⇤
I2 = p
⇤
E = 1, all second-period customers
buy from the incumbent and entry does not occur (Implicit discrimination –
separating equilibrium).
(b) If ql < 1+ 1+ cI q
s, and Qs < min{Q, Q˜(cI)}, Firm I sets
M⇤ =   1 +  cI , 0 ; 1 in period 1, and all customers choose the rebate of-
fer and purchase ql. In period 2, large customers purchase ql and small
12This condition is given by Qs > Q(cI) and Qs < Q˜(cI), in Proposition 4 below.
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customers qs, and entry does not occur (No discrimination – pooling equilib-
rium).
2. Entry accommodation:
(a) IfQs > Q, Firm I setsM⇤ =  (1+ (cI ),); 1 , where  = 1Ql [f QscI ].
Firm I ’s profit is given by ⇧EAI = Q(1   cI) +  ⇢E , where ⇢E = QcI   f
is Firm E’s rent. In period 2, Firm E decides to enter, and makes no profit:
⇧EAE = 0.
(b) Otherwise, Firm I setsM⇤ =  (1+ (cI ✏), ✏); 1 , where ✏ is strictly positive
and tends to 0. In period 1, all recurrent customers choose the rebate offer,
while all occasional customers choose to pay the stand-alone price p⇤I1 = 1.
Firm I ’s profit is ⇧EAI t Q(1  cI) +  QlcI . In period 2, Firm E decides to
enter, and makes a profit ⇧EAE t QscI   f .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows the incumbent can implement an entry-deterrent stan-
dardized rebate offer when facing only recurrent customers with different de-
mand functions.
The main difference with the situation where the incumbent faces occa-
sional and recurrent customers is the existence of “buyer opportunism.” At
equilibrium, the rebate offer can induce small customers to purchase un-
needed units of the good from the incumbent. This additional first-period
revenue allows the incumbent to finance its exclusionary strategy. This strat-
egy leads to a pooling equilibrium: when the quantity demanded by small
customers (qs) is close enough to the quantity purchased by large customers
(ql), the incumbent cannot implement a rebate offer that allows it to select
large customers only. In such a case, small customers are better off pretend-
ing to be of the large type. This equilibrium strategy is of particular interest as
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it is characterized by the foreclosure of the entire second-period demand. The
rebate offer is not (even implicitly) discriminatory and the menu of prices is
equivalent to a single rebate offer. Furthermore, all customers pay the same
price in each period. Such a strategy is profitable for the incumbent simply be-
cause the rebate offer makes small customers purchase a quantity of good in
period 1 larger than they would be willing to buy when paying the stand-alone
unit prices (ql instead of qs). This rebate offer is accepted by small customers
because the difference between the quantity ql that allows a customer to ben-
efit from the rebate and the quantity qs that small customers would like to
purchase is not too significant. Interestingly, this quantity effect, which makes
entry deterrence profitable, is one of the reasons why rebates are considered
pro-competitive in most US antitrust cases.13
The following example illustrates Proposition 4.
• Let   = 1, N = 100, Q = 32, L = 50, ql = 1, qs = .5 and cI = .25. Hence,
ql > 1+ 1+ cI q
s = .8, Qs = 25 < Q and Qs > Q(cI) = 43/3 t 14.3. There-
fore, it is optimal for the incumbent to set e.g. M⇤ =  (1.25, 0); 1 . Only
large customers accept the rebate offer andM⇤ allows the incumbent to
profitably deter entry.
• Consider now a smaller difference between ql and qs, e.g. ql = .9 and
qs = .6 (instead of 1 and .5). In such a case, a small customer is better
off pretending to be of the large type and purchasing a quantity ql = .9
in period 1 to benefit from the rebate offer. Indeed, ql < 1+ 1+ cI q
s =
.96, Qs < Q and Qs < Q˜(cI) = 41.75. Therefore, it is optimal for the
incumbent to grant a rebate r⇤ = (1.25, 0), which is accepted by all first-
period customers to profitably deter entry.
13See e.g. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
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2.4 Conclusion
Loyalty rebates are particularly effective entry deterrent strategies when cus-
tomers’ preferences are heterogeneous.
This paper shows that, when demand is heterogeneous, optimal entry-
deterrent loyalty rebates consist in charging a first-period list price that is
particularly high and committing to a significantly reduced price on future
sales. This pricing scheme induces customers to select themselves according
to their type, thereby denying the rival scale. Such a mechanism diametrically
differs from other exclusionary contracts and pricing schemes, which consist
in charging an aggressive first-period prices to deter entry before enjoying a
leveraged dominant position in subsequent periods.
Moreover, implicit discrimination is neither always necessary nor possible.
The incumbent can grant non-discriminatory loyalty rebates when demand
heterogeneity is not important enough to design an incentive-compatible mech-
anism. In such a case, the rebate may induce customers who are not ex ante
eligible for the discount to behave so as to benefit from it. For instance, a
rebate can give incentives to small customers to purchase as much as large
customers do, thereby making entry deterrence profitable.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let suppose that n > 0 recurrent buyers accepted the rebate offer during the
first period. If there is entry in period 2, Firm E sets prices that undercut
Firm I ’s, i.e., piE = p to the n customers i who accepted the rebate offer and
pjE = pI2 = cI to the N  n customers j who did not. Firm E enters if and only
if np + (N   n)cI   f – which defines the entry-accommodation condition.
Furthermore, Firm E serves in Period 2 a customer who accepted the rebate
in Period 1, if p > 0.
In period 1, a recurrent customer accepts the rebate r if and only if (i) he
is better off accepting the rebate offer than paying stand-alone prices in both
periods (pI1 and pI2); and (ii) he is better off buying one unit during the first
period than refusing to buy it, thereby allowing Firm E to enter the market.14
Both recurrent customers’ participation constraints can be written as
(1  p) +  (1  p)   (1  pI1) +  (1  pE), (2.1)
(1  p) +  (1  p)    (1  cI). (2.2)
Conditions (2.1) implies (2.2), since pI1  1 and pE = cI . Recurrent cus-
tomers’ participation constraint is therefore given by:
p+  p  pI1 +  cI . (PC)
14In order to rule out miscoordination equilibria, I consider that each recurrent customer
is pivotal, meaning that all other customers behave in the same way. This indeed ensures
that all recurrent customers have an interest in jointly accepting the rebate offer. Since the
occasional customers are not interested in future units, these constraints are necessary to
ensure that the equilibrium solutions derived from the maximization program defined below
define coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Indeed, there would be entry-deterrence because of
customers’ miscoordination if, e.g., a number of recurrent customers high enough to deter
entry would accept the rebate offer such that 1 +  cI < p+  p  1 +  .
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Firm I maximization program is given by
max
p,p,pI1
 
⇧EAI = n(p  cI) + (N   n)(pI1   cI)
 
,
s.t. np+ (N   n)cI   f,
p+  p  pI1 +  cI ,
p > 0, pI1, p 2 [0, 1].
Firm I seeks to maximize p, which implies that pI1 = 1, and (PC) is bind-
ing. Therefore,
p   1
n
[f   (N   n)cI ]
As p must be strictly larger than 0, two cases must be distinguished.
Case 1 1n [f   (N   n)cI ]  0: Firm I sets p = ✏, where ✏ is strictly positive
and tends to 0. 1n [f   (N   n)cI ]  0 implies that (N   n)cI   f . Therefore,
from (A1), (N + 1)cI   (N   n)cI , which implies n < N⇤ = N  N .
In such a case, M⇤ =  (1 +  (cI   ✏), ✏); 1 . Only recurrent customers
choose the rebate offer, as p = 1 +  (cI   ✏) > 1. Therefore, n = R. Firm I ’s
profit is
⇧EAI = R(1 +  cI    ✏  cI) + (N  R)(1  cI),
⇧EAI t N(1  cI) +  RcI ,
which is larger than ⇧˜I , as   > 0. Firm E’s profit is
⇧EAI = R✏+ (N  R)cI   f,
⇧EAE t (N  R)cI   f,
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which is strictly positive because R = n 2 (0, N⇤).
Case 2 1n [f   (N   n)cI ] > 0: Firm I sets p = 1n [f   (N   n)cI ]. 1n [f   (N  
n)cI ] > 0 implies that (N   n)cI > f . Therefore, from (A1), n   N⇤ = N  N .
Furthermore, p = 1n [f   (N   n)cI ] < cI because NcI > f . This implies p > 1,
hence n = R.
In such a case,M⇤ =  (1 +  (cI   ),); 1 , where  = 1R [f   (N   R)cI ].
Firm I ’s profit is
⇧EAI = R
h
1 +  cI    
R
⇥
f   (N  R)cI)
⇤  cIi,
⇧EAI = N(1  cI) +  (NcI   f) = ⇧˜I +  ⇢E,
where ⇢E is Firm E’s rent. Firm E’s profit equals 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let suppose that n > 0 recurrent buyers accepted the rebate offer during the
first period. The following no-entry condition provides the maximum second-
period prices that Firm I can set in order to deter entry.
np+ (N   n)cI < f. (NEC)
The participation constraint (PC) is the same as before.
Firm I ’s maximization program is given by
max
p,p,pI1,pI2
 
⇧I = n(p  cI) + (N   n)(pI1   cI) +  [n(p  cI) + (N   n)(pI2   cI)]
 
,
s.t. np+ (N   n)cI < f,
p+  p  pI1 +  cI ,
p   0, pI1, pI2, p 2 [0, 1].
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⇧I increases with stand-alone prices (pI1 and pI2), which are not constrained:
p⇤I1 = p
⇤
I2 = 1. ⇧I also increases with p +  p, the participation constraint
is thus binding: p +  p = 1 +  cI . Finally, the no-entry condition implies
p < cI , since f > NcI: if p   cI , np + (N   n)cI   NcI > f , which would
contradict the NEC. Hence, p > 1. This ensures that the solutions to the
maximization problem is incentive-compatible. Indeed, the menu of prices
M = {(p, p); pI1} is incentive compatible if (i) an occasional customer has no
interest in pretending to be a recurrent one; and (ii) a recurrent customer has
no interest in pretending to be an occasional one. This implies p   pI1 and
p+  p  pI1+  pI2. If the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints
are satisfied, n = R since the R recurrent customers accept the rebate offer
and the N  R occasional ones decide to pay the stand-alone price pI1.
Rearranging the terms, the maximization problem is given by
max
p,p,pI1
 
⇧I = n(p+  p)  n(1 +  )cI + (1 +  )(N   n)(1  cI)
 
,
s.t. 0  p < 1n
⇥
f   (N   n)cI
⇤
, p < cI ,
p+  p = 1 +  cI .
Note that 1n [f (N n)cI ] < cI because Firm E’s efficiency impliesNcI f > 0.
The set of optimal rebate offers is therefore given by p⇤ = 1+ (cI ), p⇤ = ,
where  2 ⇥0, 1n [f   (N   n)cI ] .
Such rebate offers can be implemented if and only if 1n [f   (N   n)cI ] > 0,
i.e, f > (N   n)cI , that is n   N  N = N⇤.
Finally, this entry-deterrent strategy must be more profitable than entry
accommodation (which is always more profitable than independent pricing,
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as Proposition 1 shows), i.e.,  ⇧ = ⇧⇤I   ⇧EAI > 0, that is
 ⇧ = N(1  cI) +  (N  R)(1  cI) N(1  cI)   (NcI   f)
 ⇧ =  [(N  R)(1  cI)  (NcI   f)].
As   > 0,  ⇧ > 0 if and only if R < N(cI) = (1 2cI)N+f1 cI , which is equivalent to
cI < cI =
N R+f
2N R . If R = N , cI < cI implies cI <
f
N , which contradicts (A1).
Proof of Proposition 3
The non-discrimination restriction p = pI1 implies the following participation
constraints: p  1 and p  cI . It also implies that all first-period customers
choose the rebate offer. In period 1, N customers accepts the rebate offer.
In period 2, all recurrent customers pays p and all occasional customers pays
pI2 = 1. Finally, such a restriction prevents Firm I from accommodating entry.
Firm I ’s maximization program is given by
max
p,p
 
⇧I = N(p  cI) +  [R(p  cI) + (N  R)(1  cI)]
 
,
s.t. Rp+ (N  R)cI < f,
0  p  cI , p 2 [0, 1].
Therefore , p⇤ = 1, and the incumbent charges the maximum p such that
the NEC is satisfied: p⇤ = 1R
⇥
f   (N  R)cI
⇤  ✏, where ✏ is strictly positive and
tends to zero. Such rebate offers are implementable if and only if 1R [f   (N  
R)cI ] > 0, i.e, R   N  N = N⇤.
Finally, such an entry-deterrent strategy must be more profitable than in-
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dependent pricing, i.e.,  ⇧ = ⇧⇤I   (⇧˜I1 + ⇧˜I2) > 0, where
⇧⇤I = N(1  cI) +  
⇥
f   (N  R)cI  RcI  R✏+ (N  R)(1  cI)
⇤
,
t N(1  cI) +  (N  R)(1  cI) +  (f  NcI).
 ⇧ =  (N  R)(1  cI)+  (f  NcI) > 0 if and only if R < N(cI) = (1 2cI)N+f1 cI ,
which is equivalent to cI < cI = N R+f2N R . If R = N , cI < cI implies cI <
f
N ,
which contradicts (A1).
Proof of Proposition 4
Entry accommodation
n = L Firm I maximizes its profit
⇧EAI,n=L = Q
l(p  cI) +Qs(pI1   cI)
subject to the entry accommodation condition (EAC) Qlp+QscI   f , the par-
ticipation constraint (PC) p +  p  pI1 +  cI , and an incentive compatibility
condition (IC) that ensures that small customers have no interest in pretend-
ing of being of the large type: qlp +  qsp   qs(pI1 +  cI). Rearranging these
last two constraints gives qlp   qs(pI1 +  cI    p)   qsp. For any p > 0,
qlp   qsp. Therefore, when (PC) is binding, (IC) is satisfied (hence n = L).
Finally, conditions on prices are given by: p, p > 0, and pI1 2 [0, 1].
Firm I seeks to maximize p, which implies that pI1 = 1, and (PC) is bind-
ing. Hence,
p   1
Ql
(f  QscI) = 1
Ql
(Q Qs)cI
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As p must be strictly larger than 0, two cases must be distinguished.
Case 1: (Q Qs)cI/Ql  0, i.e., Qs   Q, Firm I sets p = 1 +  (cI   ✏), p = ✏,
where ✏ is strictly positive and tends to 0. Firm I ’s profit is given by
⇧EAI,n=L t Q(1   cI) +  QlcI , which is larger than ⇧˜I , as   > 0. Firm E’s
profit is given by ⇧EAE t (Qs   Q)cI , which is strictly positive because
Qs > Q.
Case 2: (Q   Qs)cI/Ql > 0, i.e., Qs < Q, Firm I sets p = 1 +  (cI   ),
p = , where  = (Q   Qs)cI/Ql. Firm I ’s profit is given by ⇧EAI,n=L =
Q(1  cI)+  (Q Q)cI , which is larger than ⇧˜I , as   > 0. Firm E’s profit
equals 0.
n = N Firm I maximizes its profit
⇧EAI,n=N = Nq
l(p  cI)
subject to the entry accommodation condition (EAC) Qlp+QscI   f , the par-
ticipation constraint (PC) p +  p  pI1 +  cI , and an incentive compatibility
condition (IC) that ensures that small customers have an interest in pretend-
ing of being of the large type: qlp +  qsp < qs(pI1 +  cI). (IC) implies (PC),
and the last two constraints can be rewritten as qlp < qs(1+  cI    p). Finally,
conditions on prices are given by: p, p > 0, and pI1 2 [0, 1].
Firm I therefore sets p = f/Q, p = q
s
ql [1 +  (cI   f/Q)]   ✏, , where ✏ is
strictly positive and tends to 0. Firm I ’s profit is given by ⇧EAI,n=N t Nqs
 
1 +
 
Q Q
Q cI
  NqlcI .
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When Qs   Q,
⇧EAI,n=N t Nqs
 
1 +  
Q Q
Q
cI
  NqlcI ,
< Nqs  NqlcI +  NqscI ,
< Q(1  cI) +  QlcI = ⇧EAI,n=L.
When Qs < Q,
⇧EAI,n=N t Nqs
 
1   Q Q
Q
cI
  NqlcI ,
< Q NqlcI +  (Q Q)cI ,
< Q(1  cI) +  (Q Q)cI = ⇧EAI,n=L.
When accommodating entry, the incumbent has no interest in designing a
rebate offer that induces small customers to purchase a quantity ql as if they
were of the large type.
Entry deterrence
n = L Only large customers have an interest in choosing the rebate offer.
Small customers have no interest in purchasing a quantity ql and benefit from
the loyalty rebate. Firm I maximizes its profit
⇧I,n=L = Q
l(p  cI) +Qs(pI1   cI) +  [Ql(p  cI) +Qs(pI2   cI)],
where p, p   0, and pI1, pI2 2 [0, 1], subject to the NEC
Qlp+QscI < f,
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and large customers’ and small customers’ incentive compatibility constraints,
which are given by
p+  p  pI1 +  cI , (ICl)
pI1  1 (PCl)
qlp+  qsp > qs(pI1 +  pI2). (ICs)
pI1  1, pI2  1 (PCs)
These constraints ensure that the equilibrium solutions derived from afore-
mentioned maximization program are coalition-proof Nash equilibria, since
any coalition of small customers only cannot makes entry occurs by refusing
the rebate and large customers have no interest in participating to a coali-
tion with small customers so as order to allow Firm E to enter the market.
Coalitions gathering small and large customers are not self-enforcing. Firm I
does not commit in period 1 on a given second-period stand-alone price. If
there is no entry, p⇤I2 = 1. Large customers’ participation constraint is bind-
ing:  p = pI1   p +  cI . Therefore, small customers’ incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied only if
p >
 qs(1  cI)
ql   qs .
Hence, p⇤I1 = 1, and
p <
(1 +  cI)ql   (1 +  )qs
 (ql   qs) =  .
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The maximization program can therefore be rewritten as
max
p
 
⇧I = Ql(p+  p)  (1 +  )QlcI + (1 +  )Qs(1  cI)
 
,
s.t. p < cI ,
0  p < 1Ql (f  QscI),
0  p <  ,
p+  p = 1 +  cI .
Since f < QcI , 1Ql (f   QscI) < cI . The set of optimal rebate offers is
therefore given by
r⇤n=L =
 
1 +  (cI   ),
 
,
where
 2
h
0,min
n 1
Ql
(f  QscI), 
o⌘
.
Such rebate offers can be implemented if 1Ql (f   QscI) > 0, i.e., Q > Qs,
and if  > 0, i.e.,
ql >
1 +  
1 +  cI
qs.
Entry deterrence is more profitable than entry accommodation when
⇧⇤I,n=L =
⇥
Ql + (N   L)(1 +  )qs⇤(1  cI) = (Q+  Qs)(1  cI)
> Q(1  cI) +  (Q Q)cI t ⇧EAI .
that is Qs > Q(cI) =
Q Q
1 cI cI , which is equivalent to cI < cI =
Qs
Q+Qs Q .
n = N All customers, even the small ones, choose to purchase ql in each
period and pay the list and reduced prices of the rebate offer. A necessary
condition is that small customers are not pivotal. If they were pivotal, they
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would refuse the rebate offer to let Firm E enter and benefit from competition
in period 2. The NEC is thus the same as in the case where n = L. The
incumbent does not charge stand-alone prices, and maximizes its profit
⇧I,n=N = Nq
l(p  cI) +  Q(p  cI)
subject to the NEC and large customers’ and small customers’ participation
constraints:
p+  p  1 +  cI (PCl)
qlp+  qsp < qs(1 +  ) (PCs)
Two situations can be distinguished.
(↵) PCl is binding (p = 1 +  (cI   p)) and PCs is always satisfied if p >  .
Firm I ’s maximization program is thus given by
max
p
 
⇧I,n=N =  (Q Nql)p+Nql(1 +  cI)  (Nql +  Q)cI
 
,
s.t. 0  p < 1Ql (f  QscI),
p >  .
Since ⇧I,n=N is decreasing with p, Firm I seeks to minimize p. Since
f > QscI , two subcases can be distinguished.
(↵1)  < 0, i.e.,
ql <
1 +  
1 +  cI
qs,
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The optimal set of rebate offers is therefore given by
r⇤↵1 =
 
1 +  cI , 0
 
.
Firm I implements such an entry-deterrent rebate:
⇧⇤I,n=N(r
⇤
↵1) = Nq
l(1  cI) +  (Nql  Q)cI
> Q(1  cI) +  (Q Q)cI t ⇧EAI ,
that isQs < Q˜(cI) = (N L)ql   (Q
l Q)cI
1 cI+ cI , i.e., cI < c˜I =
Nql Q
(1  )Nql+(2  1)Q  Q .
(↵2)
1
Ql (f   QscI) >  . The optimal set of rebate offers is therefore
given by
r⇤↵ =
 
1 +  (cI   ), 
 
= ( , ),
where  =  (1 cI)q
s
ql qs , and  =
(1+ cI)ql (1+ )qs
 (ql qs) . The conditions of
implementation of r⇤↵2 and r
⇤
N=L are the same, Firm I chooses to
grant r⇤↵2 to all first-period customers instead of r
⇤
N=L if and only if
⇧⇤I,n=N(r
⇤
↵2) > ⇧
⇤
I,n=L.
⇧⇤I,n=N (r
⇤
↵2) = Nq
l(   cI) +  Q(   cI),
= Nql
 (1  cI)qs
ql   qs +Q
(1 +  cI)ql   (1 +  )qs
ql   qs
 (Nql +  Q)cI ,
=
Q
ql   qs
⇥
 (1  cI)qs + (1 +  cI)ql   (1   )qs
⇤
+
(N   L)(ql   qs) (1  cI)qs
ql   qs   (Nq
l +  Q)cI ,
= Q+  Qs(1  cI)  (Nql +  Q)cI ,
= (Q+  Qs)(1  cI)  (Nql  Q+  Q)cI ,
< (Q+  Qs)(1  cI) = ⇧⇤I,n=L,
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because Nql > Q. Firm I therefore never implements r⇤↵2.
( ) PCs is binding and PCl is always satisfied if p <  . The optimal set of
rebate offers is therefore given by
r⇤  =
⇣qs
ql
[1 +  (1  )],
⌘
where
 2
h
0,min
n 1
Ql
(f  QscI), 
o⌘
f > QscI: the incumbent can implement this entry-deterrent rebate
offer if and only if
ql >
1 +  
1 +  cI
qs. (2.3)
⇧⇤I,n=N(r
⇤
 ) = Nq
s(1 +  )  (Nql +  Q)cI . Since the conditions of imple-
mentation of r⇤  and r⇤N=L are the same, Firm I chooses to grant r⇤N=L
instead of r⇤  if and only if ⇧⇤I,n=L > ⇧⇤I,n=N(r⇤ ).
⇧⇤I,n=L  ⇧⇤I,n=N (r⇤ ) = (Q+  Qs)(1  cI) Nqs(1 +  )  (Nql +  Q)cI ,
= L
⇥
ql(1 +  cI)  qs(1 +  )
⇤
+ (N   L)(ql   qs)cI ,
which is strictly positive since ql > 1+ 1+ cI q
s. Firm I therefore never
implements r⇤ .
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